Accretion of Federal Power in Labor Arbitration-The Example of Arbitral Discovery by Jones, Edgar A., Jr.
[Vol.116
THE ACCRETION OF FEDERAL POWER IN
LABOR ARBITRATION-THE EXAMPLE
OF ARBITRAL DISCOVERY *
EDGA A. JoNEs, JR.t
I
THE CHANGING ROLE OF ARBITRATION
Arbitration has existed for centuries in parallel with adjudication 1
as a method of obtaining a binding decision of a dispute between
private citizens. Although arbitral awards had to be enforced through
judicial proceedings, the courts would enforce them "when fairly and
lawfully made, without hesitation or question," as Justice Story de-
clared in 1845 in Tobey v. County of Bristol.' In the Anglo-American
tradition, however, arbitration would not be compelled by the courts;
a contractual commitment to arbitrate was not specifically enforceable.
"A court of equity," Justice Story said, "ought not to compel a party to
submit the decision of his rights to a tribunal, which confessedly does
not possess full, adequate, and complete means, within itself, to investi-
gate the merits of the case, and to administer justice." Justice Story
* This is the second of three articles exploring the adaptability of discovery pro-
cedures to arbitration in discovery situations occurring during the terms of collective
bargaining agreements. The first was Jones, Blind Man's Buff and the NOW-prob-
lems of Apochrypha, Inc., and Local 711-Discovery Procedures in Collective Bargain-
ing Disputes, 116 U. PA. L. Ray. 571 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Blind Man's Buff].
The third will appear under the title The Labor Board, the Courts and the Arbitrator
-A Feasibility Study of Tribunal Interaction in Grievable Refusals to Disclose. My
colleague, William Cohen, gave me helpful criticisms while I was preparing this second
of the three articles comprising this study.
Blind Man's Buff indicated the need for an arbitral discovery procedure in the
administration of collective bargaining agreements. Arbitral discovery would benefit
both unions and employers who are now faced with the prospect of dealing with prob-
lems created by refusal to disclose information through the extended procedures of the
National Labor Relations Board.
This article will explore the range of policy questions involved in any adaptation
of discovery procedures to labor arbitration and will examine various legal doctrines
and theories which may be available to effectuate that adaptation.
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. A.B. 1942, Wesleyan
University. LL.B 1950, University of Virginia. Member, Virginia Bar and National
Academy of Arbitrators. See Caveat au Douglas, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 571 n.* (1968),
for my compliance with Mr. Justice Douglas' suggestions in Law Reviews and Full
Discloswre, 40 WAsu. L. REv. 227, 228 (1965).
1 "ADUDICATI ON is used of the determination of matters in dispute by the decision
of a competent court; ARBrrRATiON, of the determination of such matters by the deci-
sion of arbitrators, whose decision may not be binding until confirmed by a higher
court or assented to by the parties." WEnsrTa's NE W IN=NRNATIONTAL DicroNARY
33 (2d ed. unabr. 1950).
2 Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320 (No. 14,065) (C.C. Mass.
1845).
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observed that arbitrators at common law could not compel discovery;
they had power neither to subpoena nor to administer oaths.3 Further-
more, "they are not ordinarily well enough acquainted with the prin-
ciples of law or equity, to administer either effectually, in complicated
cases; and hence it has often been said, that the judgment of arbitrators
is but rusticum ]udicium." ' Tobey's counsel had argued that "in
modern times" most nations not only favored arbitration but often
made it compulsory. Not so, said Justice Story; when made com-
pulsory "it is by legislative authority, which at the same time, arms
the arbitrators with the fullest powers to ascertain the facts, to compel
the attendance of witnesses, to require discovery of papers, books and
accounts, and generally, also, to compel the parties to submit themselves
to examination under oath." ' Even then, "so far as the system of
compulsive arbitrations has been tried in America, the experiment has
not, as I understand, been such as to make a favorable impression upon
the public mind, as to its utility or convenience. At all events, it
cannot be correctly said, that public policy, in our age, generally favors
or encourages arbitrations which are to be final and conclusive, to an
extent beyond that which belongs to the ordinary operations of the
common law." 6
3 Id. at 1320.
4 Id. at 1321.
LId. The Justice added that "arbitrations are never, or at least not ordinarily,
made compulsive to the extent of excluding the jurisdiction of the regular courts of
justice... !' Id. He saw them as "mere preliminaries" to appeals to the courts in
which the law and the facts would be re-examinable.
GId. Even were it so, he reasoned, and the ground of the existing doctrine were
felt to be "not solid or satisfactory," a judge "must content himself upon this, as many
other occasions, to administer the established law, and walk in the footsteps of his
predecessors, super antiquas vias." Id. at 1320.
Poor Tobey! If ever there was an antiqua via, it was his Plymouth-Bristol
road. He contracted with the commissioners of Bristol county on January 1, 1828,
to build it. He also undertook to procure the location of that part of the overall route
which lay in Plymouth county. There was to be "a new and more eligible avenue
from Taunton to New Bedford." But the Bristol county commissioners, contrary to
their contractual commitment, failed to record the legal location of their road, "the
same was illegal, and your petitioner was put to great expense and delay to procure
the legal location of the said road in Plymouth county, and the working of the same."
So the Bristol commissioners and Tobey "mutually waived" the original contract and
the commissioners promised to indemnify him for the additional expenses caused
him by their oversight. He went on with the roadbuilding, therefore, and it was ac-
cepted by the county in June, 1830. It had since been "a very useful one for the
county." Id. at 1315. But the commissioners again defaulted and Tobey had to go
to law. But he only got partial recompense. He then turned to arbitration by suc-
cessfully petitioning the Massachusetts legislature to adopt a resolution in 1839 (eleven
years after starting the road, nine after its completion), id. at 1316, authorizing the
commissioners to submit the matter of his recompense to arbitration. Still the com-
missioners, consenting to arbitrate some of the claims on November 22, 1842, nonethe-
less refused to submit those of his claims they deemed unfair and unjust. So in the
May term, 1845, of the federal circuit court sitting in Massachusetts, Tobey sought
through a bill in equity to compel the commissioners to submit the dispute to arbitra-
tion as authorized in the legislature's resolution of 1839. Tobey finally had come to
the end of the road after those 17 persistent years, only to find that his way was
blocked by Mr. Justice Story's own equally persistent but more compelling antiqua via.
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A century later, by the end of World War II, Justice Story's
basic public policy premise had been reversed. Arbitration had been
effectively converted to the uses of a wartime economy searching for
industrial stability, and was about to enter a decade of considerable
growth. Thousands of labor disputes arising under collective bargain-
ing agreements were to be resolved through the decisions of several
hundred arbitrators and with no involvement of the courts.'
This evolution was accelerated in 1957 by the Supreme Court in
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,' where the Court concluded that
Congress, in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, had "adopted a policy
which placed sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance dis-
putes," 9 thereby laying the statutory foundation which Justice Story
believed to be necessary. The Court, in a judicial tour de force of
striking dimensions, declared that:
[T] he substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is
federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy
of our national labor laws. . . . The Labor Management
Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It
points out what the parties may or may not do in certain
situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of
express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory
sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the
legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that
policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined
by the nature of the problem.1"
The Court also pointed to state law as a possible resource of policy.
But it decreed that any state law utilized will be absorbed and become
federal law and "will not be an independent source of private rights." "'
Despite the rapid growth of arbitration as an effective means of
settling labor disputes, the procedural deficiencies inhibiting fact-
discovery by arbitration, which were underscored by Mr. Justice
" For an historical summary of the development of arbitration, see Jones, Power
and Prudence in the Arbitration of Labor Disputes: A Venture in Sonte Hypotheses,
11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 675, 701-09 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Jones, Power and
Prudenwe].
8 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
9 Id. at 456.
10 Id. at 456-57. The Court later broadened its summons to encompass state judges
so that they could act concurrently. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 95 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). It has
been said that Lincoln Mills set a new direction "pregnant with possibilities" not only
for arbitration and collective bargaining, but also for relations between the federal
and state governments, the Supreme Court and Congress, and ultimately perhaps, even
between citizens and the courts. Friendly, It Praise of Erie-and of the New Fed-
eral Common Law, 19 RECORD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 64, 85 (1964) ; see Jones, Jurisdictional
Dispute Arbitration; The Jostling Professors-For the Respondent, 14 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 351 (1966).
"1353 U.S. at 457.
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Story,12 remain unresolved. Even though current public policy favors
voluntary arbitration of labor disputes, we still continue, in large
measure, to adhere to outmoded assumptions regarding the power of
arbitrators to fashion discovery procedures. These assumptions are,
first, that arbitrators do not have discovery powers unless they are
expressly provided for either by the collective bargaining agreement
or by state statute; and second, that arbitrators in general, for reasons
almost universally unstated, ought not in any event to be empowered
to administer discovery procedures.'8
Today those older assumptions no longer retain their validity with
respect to labor arbitration. The evolution of labor-management col-
lective bargaining 4 has been stimulated and sustained by responses to
pragmatic rather than theoretical considerations. The current de-
velopment of modes of resolution of labor disputes reflects a significant
and complex redistribution of decision-making power among federal
and state courts, the National Labor Relations Board and privately
selected arbitrators. This tribunal interaction directly affects the
resolution of those disputes which occur during the terms of approxi-
mately 125,000 existing collective bargaining agreements (of which
perhaps 95 per cent have arbitration provisions) involving a third or
so of the nation's work force.'5 The stimulus for this redistribution
of decision-making power is federal; in execution, it is a judicial
rather than a legislative phenomenon. And its tendency is to rely less
on statutory criteria and more on contractual standards bargained out
prior to a specific dispute by management and the union, each in pur-
suit of its own views of its economic and philosophical interests which
are at once personal, constituent and institutional.
The logic of this evolution commits jurisdiction over most (but
by no means all) of the first-instance labor disputes arising in the
course of collective agreements to jointly created and staffed "private"
arbitration tribunals.' 6 A relatively small number of first-instance
problems are reserved by operation of law (irrespective of the wishes
l2 Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320 (No. 14,065) (C.C. Mass.
1845).
23 See generally Blind Man's Buff 576 n.6.
14 See generally C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LANW 29 (2d ed. rev. 1958).
15 See U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR SATisncs, DEV' oF LABOR, BuLr. No. 1425-1,
MAJOR CoL.EcrivE BARGfuNi G AGREmENTs-GRIEVANCE PROCEDUREs (1964). See
also U.S. BupmnAu oF LABOR STATisTIcs, DE,'T oF LABOR, Bull No. 1425-6, ARBITRA-
TION PRocmDusRS (1966).
If It is something of a misnomer to categorize labor arbitration today as a "private
tribunal." See Jones, Power and Prudence 741. And see my forthcoming paper deliv-
ered at and to be published in the proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Institute on
Labor Law of the Southwestern Legal Foundation: The Schizophrenic World of
Labor Arbitration and Mr. Q. Vadis, Arbitrator (1968).
834 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
of the bargainers) for initial decision by the Board or by the courts. 7
Aside from legal concepts, the vast bulk of contract disputes is resolved
by the parties through the operation of their grievance procedures
terminating in arbitration, with no recourse to the courts or the
Board. At least 10,000 arbitral decisions issue each year, in contrast
to about 150 to 200 judicial decisions and about two dozen Board
orders disposing of contractual issues which could otherwise be
arbitrated. As to other problems, there is considerable overlap in the
responsibility of the various tribunals, although there is now a tendency
to evolve a predetermined sequence of tribunal interaction.' 8
With these developments in the background, we may now examine
the various policy questions involved in the adaptation of discovery
procedures to the arbitral process, and the incorporation of these pro-
cedures into the evolving Board-court-arbitration system for the
resolution of labor disputes occurring during the terms of collective
bargaining agreements. Broadly speaking, those policies may be said
to comprise two sets of concerns: first, those primarily economic in
nature, radiating from the nature of the institution of collective bargain-
ing and the expectations of its future; and second, those which are
legal, concerning regulation of economic activities, judicial adminis-
tration and rights of the individual. We turn now to the economic
considerations involved in an arbitral discovery remedy.
II
ECONOMIc ASPECTS OF ARBITRAL DIscOVERY
Reactions to the prospect of arbitral discovery raise concerns about
the nature and growth of the labor arbitral process. These concerns
17 Some of these problems cannot be resolved jointly by the parties because their
bargaining relationship has so seriously deteriorated as to require governmental inter-
vention. For example, there may be refusals to disclose information needed to ad-
minister the collective agreement, a violation of sections 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C.
§158(a) (5) (1964), and 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (3) (1964), of the National
Labor Relations Act, which may warrant treatment as a statutory, rather than as a con-
tractual, problem when the issue is presented to the Labor Board. The Board is
empowered to make that choice. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Corp., 385 U.S. 423 (1967).
Other problems may involve the interests of persons not parties to the agreement when
these interests cannot fairly be disposed of without their participation. But arbitral
techniques are being evolved in response to some of them. See, e.g., Dannett, Arbitra-
tion of Jurisdictional md Representational Disputes, N.Y.U. 2 0TH ANN. CoNF OF LABOR
(1967) ; Jones, A Sequel in the Evolttion of the Trilateral Arbitration of rurisdictional
Labor Disptes-The Supreme Court's Gift to Embattled Employers, 15 U.C.L.A.
L. RFv. No. 3 (April, 1968) ; Jones, An Arbitral Answer to a Judicial Dilemma: The
Carey Decision and Trilateral Arbitration of Jurisdictional Disputes, 11 U.C.L.A.
L. RE:v. 327 (1964). Compare Stardust Hotel, 50 Lab. Arb. - (1968) (E. Jones,
Arbitrator), with Maier Brewing Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 1115 (1966) (E. Jones, Arbi-
trator). Sometimes a private solution will contravene a preemptive public policy.
See, e.g., Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1956) (per curiam), reversing
223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
18 For example, it is the avowed policy of the Labor Board to defer to an existent
arbitration procedure in "appropriate circumstances." See 31 NLRB ANN. REP. 43
(1966).
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principally focus on (A) the impact on the quality of collective bargain-
ing, its arbitral process, and the changing expectations of the roles
properly assignable to arbitration in the structure of national labor
policy; (B) the manifest trend toward greater complexity in the
fulfillment of those roles; (C) the erosion of consensuality as the sole
foundation of labor arbitration; (D) the potential for abuse of discovery
procedures; and (E) the "institutional competence" of the arbitrator
relative to the administration of discovery in the setting of collective
bargaining.
A. The Impact of Discovery on Collective Bargaining
1. The Intent of the Parties
It has recently been stated that "discovery is generally not avail-
able as an incident of the arbitration proceeding itself" because it is
"inconsistent with the desires of parties who refer their disputes to
arbitrators rather than to formal judicial tribunals." '1 The reason
given for withholding access to judicial discovery in an arbitral pro-
ceeding is that the parties to an arbitration agreement have expressed
their preference for an informal, expedited, and less costly method of
dispute-resolution than is available through judicial proceedings. To
thrust upon one of them the judicial apparatus of discovery, it is felt,
is to deny to that party the anticipated incidents of his bargain.
But this summary dismissal of the prospect of discovery in arbitra-
tion is founded on certain untenable assumptions. Essentially, these
assumptions beg the following questions:
(a) Have the parties, by executing an arbitration agreement con-
taining no reference to discovery procedures, necessarily demonstrated
their intent never to be compelled to make disclosure through discovery
in connection with disputes arising under the agreement?
(b) During negotiations, were there situations foreseeable from
which an inference might reasonably be drawn that they contemplated
an obligation of disclosure?
19 Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REV. 940, 943 (1966). Com-
mercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), is often cited for the proposition that arbitral discovery is not only unavailable,
but also deserves to be characterized as superfluous and incompatible. Id. at 362.
The court there noted that "by voluntarily becoming a party to a contract in which
arbitration was the agreed mode for settling disputes thereunder respondent chose to
avail itself of procedures peculiar to the arbitral process rather than those used in
judicial determinations." Id. at 361. Judge Learned Hand articulated a common
conception of arbitration when he said of parties to an arbitration agreement:
they must be content with its informalities; they may not hedge it about with
those procedural limitations which it is precisely its purpose to avoid. They
must content themselves with looser approximations to the enforcement of
their rights than those that the law accords them. ...
American Almond Prods. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d
Cir. 1944).
1968]
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(c) Are there contractual provisions, aside from the arbitration
provision, which lead to the conclusion that disclosure is an enforceable
contractual commitment?
(d) Are there obligations of disclosure imposed by law which
warrant the conclusion that they are implicitly integrated as contractual
commitments?
None of those questions can be summarily answered either to
affirm or to deny arbitral discovery. The answers must be determined
in light of the necessities of an effective labor arbitral process and of
the reasonably deducible intent of the parties to a particular collective
agreement.
It is obvious that a major purpose of the usual multi-step
grievance procedure is to achieve the earliest possible disclosure of the
operative facts of the dispute and the dispositive contractual 'provisions.
It is in the pressing self-interest of each party, for many reasons-
psychological, political and economic-to get the dispute resolved as
soon as possible. The passage of time sparks unresolved grievances
into begetting new ones; it causes irresolution among supervisors and
employees concerning how they ought to operate, mutual distrust, a
reluctance to "get on with it" at the job lest the "rights" of either
somehow be jeopardized, and a hardening of compromise attitudes; and
it generates suspicions of motives. Neither party to a collective agree-
ment in a normal bargaining situation benefits from uncertainty in the
operation of the grievance procedure, and both parties realize it. To
that strong impetus to disclosure is linked the joint intent to submit the
few unresolvable disputes to an arbitrator they jointly select.
Disclosure is thus a normal characteristic of a properly functioning
grievance procedure. The grievance procedure establishes a routine
expectation among workers and supervisors that if someone has a
"gripe" about job performance or working conditions he is supposed
to "get it off his chest." Were it otherwise, it is recognized, disputes
would fester and infect the working relationships in the bargaining
unit. This operates to the economic and psychological detriment of
the employees, the employer and the union. The whole thrust of the
grievance procedure is toward early and complete disclosure so that
settlement can ensue. Therefore, the existence of a grievance pro-
cedure, capped by an arbitration agreement, strongly implies a con-
tractual obligation to disclose. The parties will normally have directed
their arbitrator to abide by and not "alter, amend or modify" their
contract. In order to fulfill this mandate and formulate a sound inter-
pretation of contractual intent, the arbitrator must have access to the
stuff and substance of their disputes. If one party withholds informa-
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tion needed in order to present the arbitrator with as complete a view
of the dispute as possible, that refusal to disclose is incompatible with
the decisional responsibility imposed on the arbitrator by both parties."0
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Acme Industrial has observed
that the grievance procedure performs an indispensable winnowing
function:
Arbitration can function properly only if the grievance pro-
cedures leading to it can sift out unmeritorious claims. For
if all claims originally initiated as grievances had to be
processed through to arbitration, the system would be
woefully overburdened.2
In addition to the parties' contractual intent to effectuate disclosure
through their grievance procedure, national labor policy requires it of
them-and they bargain under its aegis. Employers and unions, under
sections 8(a) (5),2 8(b) (3),3 and 8(d), 4 are required to bargain in
good faith. This obligation includes disclosure of data relevant to their
negotiations about wages, hours and conditions of employment. In-
formation necessary to the proper functioning of the grievance pro-
cedure must be disclosed under that statutory duty to bargain." Al-
though the Labor Board seems almost exclusively to have been dealing
with employer refusals, 26 there is no doubt that unions are required to
disclose when circumstances warrant an employer's inquiry. It is
elementary contract law that the parties are routinely deemed to enter
into their collective agreement with the intention to abide by the
obligations imposed upon them by law.
Further evidence of an implicit disclosure-intent is the fact that
the absence of arbitral discovery preserves the outmoded "sporting
theory of justice" in the collective bargaining process. This kind of
legal gamesmanship has been eliminated in the courts by adoption of
modern discovery rules, exemplified by the Federal Rules of Civil
20 Of course, the parties can expressly confer or withhold authority from the arbi-
trator to administer discovery. The real problems naturally arise when the agreement
is silent on the subject. If it explicitly or implicitly empowers the arbitrator to use
discovery techniques, the legal procedures to enforce his award will be found in federal
law if the dispute involves interstate commerce. See note 200 infra.
21 385 U.S. at 438.
22National Labor Relations Act §8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(5) (1964)
[hereinafter cited as NLRA].
23Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (3) (1964) [hereinafter cited as LMRA].
24 LMRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
2 See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967).
26 No union refusal-to-disclose case was found in which the Board issued an order
to a union to disclose. See, however, Discovery Situation #1, in Blind Mant' Buff
558, detailing the facts of Associated Home Builders v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745 (9th
Cir. 1965).
838 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.116:830
Procedure, but remains quite visible in the arbitration of labor disputes.
When calculated nondisclosure or surprise disclosure succeeds in
frustrating the prosecution or defense of an arbitral grievance, col-
lective bargaining has been injured. This manuever is incapable of
satisfactory justification to those employees, unions or employers who
should prevail on the merits, but who have been bilked by tactical
artifice.
We may conclude, therefore, that disclosure through the grievance
procedure is the deducible intent of the parties when their agreement
is silent on the subject of arbitral discovery. The arbitrator who
issues an arbitral discovery order in appropriate circumstances is
functioning within the ambit of their interest.
2. The Compatibility of Discovery With Bargaining
An identifiable concern over the prospect of discovery is whether
its use might unduly stimulate an adversary atmosphere inimical to the
continuing relationship of the bargaining parties. It might be thought
enough of a response to that concern simply to observe that "adversari-
ness" already exists where there is, on one side, an insistent demand
for disclosure and, on the other, an adamant refusal to disclose. But
the question expresses a deeper concern based on the marked char-
acteristic of continuity unique to American collective bargaining: so
many employers and unions accept their bargaining relationship as
going on indefinitely.
Yet collective bargaining confronts an employer with officials of
a union who are the elected and certified representatives of his em-
ployees. The officials are elected by secret ballot. Their political life,
possibly the continued institutional existence of the union and cer-
tainly its continued status as bargaining representative for this group
of employees, require that they engage in adversary bargaining on
behalf of their constituents. Their goal is to elicit the most favorable
wages, hours and conditions that can be gained from the employer.
The bargaining table in the American tradition is a tug-and-haul arena
in which forbearance for the common good is rare. But even where a
joint effort is made to gear worker appetite for income to employer
capacity to satisfy it, the atmosphere typically can only be regarded as
adversary. This is not necessarily invidious. The legal system on
which we base our expectations of due process relies on conflicting
pursuits of self-interest, through the efforts of representatives ex-
perienced in the arts of advocacy, to produce a binding resolution of
the dispute. We accept that result as the "justice" of the case. But
we recognize that this is an acceptance which may not conform to the
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conclusion of some enlightened philosopher who is somehow informed
of all the available subjective and objective elements caught up in the
particular human situation. The truth is that there is a marked
similarity between the Anglo-American adversary system of justice
and the socio-economic institution we call collective bargaining. It is
difficult to see how arbitral discovery, prudently administered, would
either trigger or accentuate combative impulses not already harnessed
to the task of negotiations between unions and employers.
Arbitration, however, is not a process which can put back together
a bargaining relationship that has come unstuck. In that context, it is
useless to embroil the arbitrator in the bitter atmosphere of a fractured
relationship in which any remedy he may fashion will be foredoomed
to failure. Rather than arbitration, economic self-help and litigation,
whether in court or before an administrative agency, constitute the
primary means for the resolution of disputes in such situations.
But tough bargaining, including resort by a union to a lawfully
conducted economic strike, is a common occurrence in American in-
dustrial relations, and it is crucial to recognize that this does not
necessarily evidence a fractured relationship. Non-strike collective
bargaining often seems preferable for all concerned, but it remains true
in our economy that unions often need to counter economic pressures of
employers by the ultimate economic pressure device at their command-
the withholding of their labor. Strikes are an aspect of bargaining,
not its antithesis.
Similarly, an employer's or a union's refusal to disclose informa-
tion during the term of a collective agreement should not alone be
considered unlawful. It does not necessarily evidence bad-faith
bargaining. Far more often than not, it is merely a symptom of
hard-headed bargaining, a reality which the Board often fails to
grasp. Thus it makes far more sense to put an expedited disclosure
remedy within the control of the parties to the agreement than it does
to impale them for years upon a Board proceeding which, at best, would
ultimately result in an abstract vindication of the statutory right to
disclosure. We are concerned in discovery situations with reinforcing
a sound bargaining relationship; we ought to be receptive to whatever
system compresses time, remains close to the control of the parties,
eliminates the need for governmental intrusion, and effectively requires
appropriate disclosures.
The Board's statutory structure effectively vitiates its usefulness
as a viable discovery mechanism. As we shall see in the third article
in this series, it takes the Board an average of 17 months to issue a
disclosure order. In the 49 per cent of the Board's disclosure orders
1968]
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requiring federal court enforcement, an average of more than 29 months
elapses between the demand for disclosure and the court's enforcement
of the order. There are types of grievances in which that kind of delay
in disclosure removes any prospect of adequate relief for contractual
wrongs. Some examples are employee discharges, union no-strike
violations, bargaining-unit work assignments, discriminations against
employers, and subcontracting disputes."
3. The Element of Compulsion
Viewing arbitration as a consensual process, exclusive of elements
of compulsion, some would be apt to reject the prospect of arbitral
discovery on the ground that the introduction of any element of com-
pulsion in the bargaining relationship should only be the result of
negotiations.2" They would argue that since discovery relies on com-
pulsion to cause information to be disgorged by someone unwilling to
disclose, and since techniques involving unilaterally invoked compulsion
are incompatible with the basic premise of consent, only techniques
which have been bilaterally negotiated should be utilized in labor
arbitration. The role of consensuality has been somewhat exaggerated
in discussions of labor arbitration. It is undoubtedly true that we place
consensuality very high in our order of values. But we have had little
hesitancy over the years in fashioning remedies, when we feel they are
needed, which blend compulsion with consensual elements to achieve a
workable balance. Nor has the Supreme Court been deterred by this
conceptual problem. In 1964, in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,
2 9
the Court observed that the central reality of "the peculiar status and
function of a collective bargaining agreement is the fact . . . that it is
not in any real sense the simple product of a consensual relationship." 10
Again, in 1966, Justice Black (himself a close critic of the judicial
doctrines governing the labor arbitral process) emphasized for the
Court in Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union
Pacific Railroad 1 the marked differences between mercantile contracts
and the collective bargaining agreement. The latter "is not an
ordinary contract for the purchase of goods and services, nor is it
governed by the same old common-law concepts, which control such
27 See generally the discussion in Blind Man's Buff 602-04.
28 Compare Bernstein, Nudging and Shoving All Parties to a Jurisdictional Dis-
pute Into Arbitration: The Dubious Procedure of National Steel, 78 HAzv. L. REv.
784 (1965), with Jones, On Nudging and Shoving the National Steel Arbitration Into
a Dubious Procedure, 79 HAv. L. REv. 327 (1965).
29 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
30 Id. at 550.
31385 U.S. 157 (1966).
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private contracts." 2 Yet one can preserve a working preference for
consensuality without feeling obligated to reject useful arbitral tech-
niques simply because they may be thought to be tainted with strains
of compulsion.
Discovery has for centuries been accepted by the courts as an
allowable instrument of justice despite its manifest elements of com-
pulsion. But in the context of collective bargaining, as we have seen,
consensual elements do exist which point persuasively to a contractual
commitment to disclose. Such consensual elements support an arbitral
discovery remedy.
4. The Concern About "Legalistic" Complexity
Labor arbitration became visibly more complex in the decade from
1957 to 1967, particularly in its interactions with courts and the Labor
Board. This development is a matter of concern to many. Arbitral
discovery would manifestly be another step in that "deplored" direction.
Some would argue that what is needed instead is a reversal of the
trend so that arbitrators may, as before, deal directly with the parties
without concern for the interposition of "outside" policies or tribunals,
Would recognition of an arbitral discovery remedy result in burdening
the grievance procedure with unwanted and unneeded formalism,
legalism and complexity?
Although resistance to further complexity is warranted, it is also
necessary to react to demonstrated need. The inquiry should be aimed
at that demonstration rather than smothered by abstract concerns about
"legalism." As we have seen in Blind Man's Buff,"3 a real need exists.
The need, then, is to design an arbitral discovery remedy which will
avoid the evils of undue complexity.
Perhaps the principal concern about injecting "legalistic" pro-
cedure into arbitration in this instance is that discovery might prove
too elaborate and time-consuming for this informal process, which must
handle "small" as well as "big" cases in an expedited and inexpensive
manner. The typical labor arbitration hearing is brief. Furthermore,
kobben Fleming has demonstrated that there has been little change in
the number of hearing days consumed in arbitration in the 1951-1963
period.3 4 Confirmed by an independent Federal Mediation and Con-
ciliation Service tabulation of all cases in its files for 1962 (the average
being 1.15 days), his research for selected periods (1951-52, 1956-57,
1962-63), limited to discharge cases, disclosed one-day hearings to be
321d. at 160-61.
3 See note * supra.
34 R. FLEIumI, THE LABoR ARBrrRAmo PRocEss 39-40 (1965).
19681
842 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
overwhelmingly typical. Of a 98-case sample in the 1962-63 period he
found that about 82 were concluded in no more than one full day,
some taking less than a full day.
Fleming's data confirm the impression drawn from experience that
it is only in a rare situation that an arbitrator finds it necessary to
recess the hearing because of what courts would regard as pre-trial
problems. It is quite common for an arbitrator to suggest, in the
course of the morning, what we might call, rhetorically, "lunchbreak
discovery": "Why don't you dig that out during the lunchbreak and
make it available?" The parties general comply and disclosure is
routine when the hearing resumes after luncheon.
These facts should put to rest the concern that discovery is too
elaborate a process to be used in an arbitration in which the stakes are
not substantial. Quite aside from the fact that the grievant is always
likely to see the outcome as important, the "small" case already com-
mitted to arbitration may well benefit, at least as much as the "big"
case, from resort to discovery. Mr. Justice Brennan, reflecting on his
extensive state and federal judicial experience, has observed that pre-
trial procedures are perhaps even more needed in the small than in
the big case, because of their effectiveness in putting "people in a frame
of mind to settle." "
As that suggests, even the prospect of discovery may help resolve
the "small" case. Beyond that, there is also a built-in regulator in
that kind of case which discourages undue resort to discovery. The
reaction of the opposite party must be calculated. Is he apt to retaliate
in kind? If so, cost could escalate, and, in turn, the adversary may get
a look behind the initiator's tactical facade. This possibility might
well lead either a union or an employer to back off from a discovery
situation. But where there is an abiding sense of having been con-
tractually wronged, or a lingering fear that substantial rights may be
in jeopardy due to imperfectly understood or uncertainly perceived
actions by the other party to the collective agreement, there is often a
pressing need for resolution. Simple discovery techniques can be
applied to effectuate that resolution without making a "federal case"
out of each request for discovery. Since the efficient operation of the
grievance procedure requires fair disposition of each case, and since
neither party will normally escalate a "small" case into a "big" one by
unwarranted resort to discovery, it makes no sense to oppose arbitral
discovery because of some notion of a distinction between "big" and
"small" cases.
35 Brennan, Introduction to the Problem of the Protracted Case, 23 F.R.D. 376,
379 (1958).
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5. The Expense of Arbitral Discovery
On the other hand, whether the case be "big" or "small," un-
doubtedly a major concern at the prospect of arbitral discovery is that
of the expense thought to be involved. Expense has been invoked as
the major element in deducing an intent to reject discovery among
parties to commercial arbitrations. In addition, there is the national
policy, strongly emphasized in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to
minimize the costs of litigation. But the danger of significantly in-
creased expense due to use of arbitral discovery in a labor case is not
a real one. This is so for two reasons.
First, most employers and unions who become involved in NLRB
refusal-to-disclose proceedings elect to participate as intervenors, a
choice which is more costly than resort to arbitral discovery would
normally be. This means that seeking disclosure through a Board
proceeding will not necessarily be inexpensive for a union or an
employer as the charging party.
Second, the costs of arbitral discovery would not in fact be great.
The Speck study of federal practice found that discovery costs about
$300 in the ordinary tort action in which oral depositions were taken.
This involved four or five hours, four or five witnesses, and some 150
pages of transcript at a total cost of about $100 for the reporter and
$200 for the attorney. 6
At about the same time, in 1951-52, a more broadly based Uni-
versity of Minnesota study surveyed lawyers in twenty-five juris-
dictions where discovery was commonplace and in three where it was
unknown in the state practice." Oral questioning was much preferred
(92 out of 97 respondents) to written interrogatories. The replies also
indicated that lawyers were hardly harassing their adversaries with
barrages of depositions; 2.166 was the average number per case, "for
the obvious reason that in the small case so many depositions are
neither needed nor economically feasible." "8 Although Federal Rule 29
allows the use of an office stenographer by stipulation of the parties,
only 2 out of 95 did so; the others used commercial or court reporters.39
The cost of doing so might appear surprisingly low, relative to Speck's
1948-50 figures, until it is realized that Speck really hypothesized five
witnesses at five hours to arrive at 150 pages and $100. On the other
36 Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE LJ.
1132, 1150 (1951).
37 Wright, Wegner & Richardson, The Practicing Attorney's View of the Utility
of Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 97 (1951).
38 Id. at 100.
39 Id.
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hand, the Minnesota study showed that usually one or two witnesses
are examined at an average transcript cost of $30.87."
That 1952 cost compares roughly with a 1967 figure from Cali-
fornia, where reporters' fees are regulated by statute,41 of about $82.50,
assuming two witnesses whose testimony is contained in 60 pages
(Speck's apparent measure and the likely Minnesota study average)
with an original and one copy being produced. An added copy would
mean an additional $22.50.' The authors of the Minnesota study con-
cluded from their correspondence that "other than the cost of the
transcription itself, the expenses of discovery are negligible." 43 Of
course, they were also referring to oral depositions, not interrogatories.
The average time spent in the course of taking the deposition was
about an hour and three-quarters, and the attorneys averaged about an
hour and a half analyzing the results.44 Counting all expenses in-
volved, the average total cost to the discoverer was $56.63, and to the
adverse party $27.47.45 Finally, 99 out of 101 respondent attorneys
felt "the value of discovery to be commensurate with the expense." '6
That acceptance of discovery was accompanied mostly by enthusiastic
endorsement. One partner in a large Chicago law firm commented,
"I believe discovery by deposition to be the most valuable tool placed
in the hands of trial counsel in the last half century." 47
In labor grievance cases, arbitral discovery by deposition would
usually not involve more than one witness, perhaps two on occasion,
but rarely more. Using the 1967 California fees as a projection, and
accepting 30 pages as a good rough estimate for recording the exam-
ination of one witness, would mean a deposition cost of about $41.25,
hardly an extravagant sum. To that expense would have to be added
attorneys' fees. The Minnesota study found attorneys' deposition fees
ranged from $10 to $100. Whether there would be much resort to
deposition-discovery is questionable. It seems much more likely that
arbitral discovery would be used to elicit statements of position or
intent in documentary form, although through inquiries not framed as
elaborately as the usual interrogatory and often by an employer or
union representative without legal advice. The informality which
characterizes so many arbitral hearings may be expected to carry over
to the administration of arbitral discovery, with a consequent diminu-
tion of expense.
40 Id. at 101.
41 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8211 (1967).
42Id.
43 Wright, Wegner & Richardson, supra note 37, at 101.
44 Id. at 102.
45 Id.4 61d. at 103.
47 Id. at 105.
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6. The Cost of Letting the Board Get the Data
Another aspect of concern for expense, of course, is the mistaken
notion that disclosure through a Board proceeding will not be expensive.
When an aggrieved party, however honestly, charges a contractually
and statutorily wrongful refusal to disclose, that party will normally not
be willing to remain aloof while the NLRB pursues relief for it.
Although not a disclosure case, UAW v. Scofield4" is illustrative of
the practice of intervention. There, the Supreme Court was asked to
decide whether the prevailing party in a Labor Board proceeding had
the right to intervene in the enforcement proceedings in the court of
appeals. The Labor Board had dismissed charges against a UAW
local for fining certain members for exceeding incentive pay ceilings
set by the union. The individual employees sought review in the
Seventh Circuit. The union moved to intervene in that proceeding,
on the ground that it would be directly affected were the court to set
aside the Board order and direct entry of a remedial order. The
Supreme Court, reversing denial of the motion, established the right
of intervention.
In the course of its opinion, the Court observed that permitting
intervention "insures fairness to the would-be intervenor." " It is
true that denial of intervention would leave the denied party free and
clear of technical res judicata rules. But the Court recognized that
the realities give no great solace to a party vitally interested in the
substance of the proceeding yet unable to affect the assembly and
presentation of the stuff of decision to a tribunal which "has not
crystallized its views." 0
For precisely this reason, the Labor Board's procedures permit
the filing party to participate in the hearing with formal recognition.51
In that capacity, he may call and cross-examine witnesses; file excep-
tions to any order of the trial examiner; file a petition for recon-
sideration of a Board order; obtain review as an aggrieved person of
Board dismissal of the complaint; and now, in the reviewing court,
he may participate in designating the record, in pre-hearing conferences
for simplification of the issues; in the filing of briefs; in oral argu-
48382 U.S. 205 (1965).
49Id. at 213.
lo Id.
61 NLRB Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. § 102.8
(1965) : "The term 'party' as used herein shall mean . . . any person filing a charge
or petition under the act, any person named ... as party to a contract in any proceed-
ing under the act." For an analysis of the rights of a charging party before the Board,
see Comment, The Charging Party Before the NLRB: A Private Right in the Public
Inzterest, 32 U. CL L. REv. 786 (1965).
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ments; and in petitioning the appellate court for rehearing or in peti-
tioning the Supreme Court for certiorari.
The Supreme Court saw significant public benefit in this par-
ticipation by an affected employee, employer or union as a "party" in
defining the issues and bringing all relevant material to the attention
of the Labor Board and the appellate court.5" In addition, there is the
important judicial-administrative fact that "party" participation is con-
ducive to the "winnowing process" which results in over ninety-seven
per cent of unfair labor practice charges being resolved before the
circuit court has entered a decree.
5 3
Persons affected by an unfair labor practice commonly claim that
they have vital private rights in the Board proceedings, which require
representation by someone conversant with Board procedures and
doctrines; of course, such representation inevitably means litigation
expense. Very few unions or employers are apt to feel that they can
stand aloof from Board proceedings in order to save money. If the
actions involved are serious enough to warrant issuance of an unfair
labor practice complaint by the General Counsel, it is recognized to be
false economy indeed not to insure that the tribunal has all of the
relevant data and insights which can be marshalled. Thus, it is illusory
to think that one can avoid expense by relying on the federal govern-
ment to bear the financial burden of effecting discovery through a
Labor Board order, even in the unlikely event that the extended time-
span involved in the Board-court proceeding is not of critical concern.
7. The Prospects of Abuse
Undoubtedly a major concern about the adaptation of discovery
to arbitration is that arbitral discovery might be subject to a consider-
able amount of abuse. Litigation costs have always provided a potential
for abuse of legal procedures. For example, it is said that discovery
has been used on occasion by litigants, not really to prepare for trial,
52 382 U.S. at 215. Substantially the same kind of reasoning supports trilateral
arbitration of interunion jurisdictional disputes occurring during the term of one or
more collective agreements. See Jones, A Sequel in the Evolution of the Trilateral
Arbitration of Jurisdictional Labor Disputes-The Supreme Court's Gift to Embattled
Employers, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. No. 3 (April, 1968) ; Jones, On Nidging and Shov-
ing the National Steel Arbitration Into a Dubious Procedure, 79 HARv. L. REv. 327
(1965).
5 In fiscal 1965, a total of 15,219 unfair labor practice cases were disposed of;
85.5% were closed after a charge was filed but before the issuance of a complaint.
Another 5.5% went after issuance but before opening of a hearing. Another .8%
dropped out after commencement of the hearing and before the trial examiner's deci-
sion. After the latter, 1.3% were closed before issuance of a Board decision, and .7%
after a Board adopting the trial examiner's decision in the absence of exceptions. That
left 951 cases, 6.2% of the total. Of them, 540, 3.5% of the overall total, were closed
after the Board's decision and before circuit court decree. Of those remaining, 359, or
2.4% of the bulk, were closed after circuit court decree and 52, or .3%, only after
Supreme Court action. 30 NLRB ANN. REP. 191, table 8 (1965).
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but in order to force unwarranted settlements or to inflict undue
embarrassment, harassment or oppression on the party against whom
discovery is sought. Even though there are relatively few who now
deplore judicial discovery, the potential for abuse is there. It may
subject parties and nonparties to burdens of cost and inconvenience
disproportionate to the significance of the litigation to those who must
bear the burdens. It may entail delay. It may encroach on personal or
professional privileges. Broad probing into the outer reaches of rele-
vancy is now countenanced and the rote invocation of "fishing ex-
pedition" has lost its force through sheer repetition.
If that is possible in court litigation, what of labor arbitration?
The foreseeable abuses are not very different from those which occur
from time to time in adjudication. Would arbitral discovery be used
to blackmail settlements? to harass, oppress or unwarrantably to em-
barrass? or to engage in dilatory tactics? Would its availability result
in lazy or incompetent counsel or in overreaching bargainers embarking
upon "fishing expeditions" to seek improper entry to the files for
economic data of future bargaining value or, as to the immediate
grievance, to poach on the other side's preparation of its case? Would
abuses be indulged without rebuff by unduly lenient or unsophisticated
arbitrators?
Professor Charles Allen Wright has observed that discovery has
been "extremely popular with the bar." "' This is so despite the fact
that "there is little opportunity to obtain appellate review of discovery
rulings. Such rulings are not final orders and are not appealable as
such." 5 Surveys of lawyers practicing under the Federal Rules con-
firm the popularity of discovery.' 6
The 1948-51 Speck study of the uses of discovery in federal courts
disclosed the interesting fact that the remedies are popular and ex-
tensively employed 57 even though the lawyers interviewed were con-
vinced that relief from an abuse of discovery could not be obtained
from judges either because judges could not learn enough about the
case at the pre-trial stage to rule effectively or because of trouble,
expense and delay in obtaining relief." Abuses were felt to be isolated
incidents in a generally valuable procedure. Speck concluded from his
interviews that "curtailment of abuse must depend upon the alertness
of judges in recognizing harassment and their firmness in enforcing
542A W. BAIRON & A. HOLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 641 at 11
(Wright ed. 1961).
55 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 312 (1963).
6 Wright, Wegner & Richardson, supra note 37, at 103-05.
57 Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J.
1132, 1155 (1951).
581d. at 1153.
848 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.116:830
the responsibilities of lawyers as officers of the court." " Significantly
for arbitral discovery, the lawyers saw deliberate harassment as self-
limiting, partly because it is costly to harass, but mostly because of the
unfavorable impression that such distasteful conduct has on the decision-
maker. Indeed, the practitioners felt that abuses were limited to multi-
judge federal districts where a discovery judge would not try the case
later. "Lawyers do not care to go to trial before a judge who has
ruled on their discovery abuse." " Much less would counsel want to
convince his sole arbitrator that his case was credible despite a discovery
abuse. Although doubting the utility of discovery in arbitration,
Robben Fleming has proposed several guidelines for achieving arbitral
discovery while minimizing the potential for abuse. He would recog-
nize an obligation, absent a showing of prejudice, to make relevant
information available in an arbitration proceeding at the request of an
arbitrator.6 ' Assuming the arbitrator has no subpoena power, he sug-
gests that "an inference be drawn against the party refusing to produce
the evidence." 62 He also suggests that the arbitrator protect a party,
on request, by excising irrelevant portions of a document after privately
inspecting it. Contemplating perhaps the key objection to arbitral dis-
covery, he concedes that "there is doubtless a considerable temptation
in arbitration proceeding to embark on 'fishing' expeditions," but he
concludes that, "even so, the experienced arbitrator will have little
difficulty dealing with such cases." "
Further protection to both the would-be discoverer and his ad-
versary could be provided by application of a Jencks u-type rule in
arbitration. Such a rule would assure access to relevant data despite
a claim, other than one of privilege, that such data is confidential.
Jencks has been applied to compel production of NLRB file data in an
unfair labor practice proceeding.65 As one court observed,
The production and inspection, and possible use for cross-
examination purposes, of such a document could serve only to
test the memory and credibility of the witness, while, in the
5 Id.
6Old. at 1152.
61 R. FLEmrNG, supra note 34, at 68. Fleming imaginatively suggests the pos-
sibility of agreement to use apprentice arbitrators in routine discovery-type matters
for nominal fees. Id. at 175. It may well be that the AAA and FMCS could establish
a panel of arbitrators who would have indicated their willingness to undertake to
handle discovery matters on a fixed fee basis reflecting the lesser demand on their time
of routine discovery situations.
o2 Id. at 175.
63 Id.
64See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
65 See NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1961) ; NLRB v. Ad-
hesive Prods. Corp., 258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958) ; Schauffier v. Teamsters Local 107,
196 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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absence of a claim of confidence or privilege, there can be no
sound reason to bar such production. The request in the
case at bar was not a mere fishing expedition, but rather
concerned the credibility of the most important witness who
testified in support of the charges."6
Fleming concludes that "the principle of Jencks is as sound for the
arbitrator as for the administrative agency." "
While the actual potential for abuse inherent in arbitral discovery
may not be easy to assess, it is important to realize that the experience
with judicial discovery has, on the whole, been quite satisfactory to
those who routinely participate in it.
8. The Impact on Testimonial Privileges
There are clearly foreseeable circumstances in which an indi-
vidual's testimonial privileges may be jeopardized by arbitral discovery.
The hazard, however, is endemic to arbitration; arbitral discovery
would not create it. A witness under subpoena to testify has several
privileges entitling him to decline to answer even relevant questions.
The principal one, of course, is the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination. Other important privileges may be conferred by
statute or common law, depending on the particular jurisdiction in
which the testimony is being taken. Perhaps the most notable is the
privilege against compelled disclosure of confidential communications
between persons in certain protected relationships: husband-wife,
lawyer-client, clergymen-penitent, newsman-informant, and public offi-
cial-informer.' Either person in such a relationship is entitled to claim
his privilege of silence. 9
In Malloy v. Hogan,7 the Supreme Court held that the federal
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is binding on the
states through the fourteenth amendment. The Court's reasoning is
important for those who think that arbitration can maintain a legally
neutral existence, aloof from consideration of public policy. "It would
be incongruous," wrote Mr. Justice Brennan for the Court,
to have different standards determine the validity of a claim
of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, depending
66 NLRB v. Adhesive Prods. Corp., 258 F.2d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 1958).
67 t. FLEmtll , supra note 34, at 174.
68 It is not, of course, suggested that all of these privileges apply throughout the
United States.
69 For a discussion of these privileges in labor arbitration proceedings, see Jones,
Evidentiary Concepts in Labor Arbitration: Some Modern Variations on Ancient
Legal Themes, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1241, 1286-93 (1966).
70 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court.
Therefore, the same standards must determine whether an
accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is
justified.71
Similarly, no distinction should be tolerated between different tribunals.
Therefore, it must be assumed that the constitutional guarantee will be
applicable to arbitration. The real problem is that of waiver. It
would be difficult to conclude that the constitutional privilege is being
honestly administered if it can be held that an ignorant witness, without
aid of counsel and without warning from the arbitrator, effectively
"waived" his privilege to remain silent in later proceedings.
Thus, this problem is not properly regarded as an arbitration issue.
No matter what the arbitrator may or may not have done, or what
the intent or knowledge of the arbitration witness may have been, a
court later confronted with the claim of privilege certainly should not
feel bound if the arbitrator erroneously assured the witness that he
could testify in the arbitration without losing his right to be silent on
the subject in any subsequent proceedings. 2 Action or inaction in an
arbitral tribunal should not be controlling in the determination of im-
portant constitutional law issues, quite aside from the fact that at least
half of the arbitrators are not legally educated. The conclusion that
arbitrators' decisions on claims of constitutional privilege should not
have any effect adverse to the claimant in subsequent judicial proceed-
ings eliminates a major constitutional problem which might otherwise
plague the development of labor arbitration. 3
Apart from problems of a constitutional dimension, arbitration is
faced also with situations where disclosure may impinge on rights of
privacy. Experience indicates, however, that casual breaches of priv-
ileged communications would be no more likely at hearings than at
cocktail parties. Arbitrators will be reluctant to grant discovery orders
71Id. at 11.
'12 There is a difference between that situation and the one in which nobody at
the arbitration hearing recognizes a privilege problem when it occurs. But the dif-
ference does not warrant any distinction. In either event, a later tribunal should not
regard the witness to have waived a privilege. One valuable immediate result of that
conclusion is to relieve the arbitral tribunal of a responsibility it is not institutionally
competent to discharge.
73 At the same time, it must be admitted that even the partial disclosure of privi-
leged information which results in investigatory leads can distort an innocent reality
into the appearance of guilt. It is often the case that a lawyer will counsel his inno-
cent client to invoke his privilege of silence so that a particular fact will not be dis-
closed, because it would tend to create a false impression of wrongdoing. That kind
of "investigatively useful" disclosure may occur in an arbitration, for example in a
discharge case involving acts also constituting a crime. There is little anybody can
do to remedy the situation, nor should a remedy be attempted; the problem is not so
great in incidence as to warrant the severe impact on the arbitral process which would
result were courts to undertake to deter this kind of disclosure by invalidating awards
of arbitrators when such disclosure has improperly occurred in the course of a hearing.
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prying into private relationships, and will probably require a greater
showing of relevance in such cases. The likelihood is that no great
problem of transgression on this kind of secrecy privilege would be
created in arbitration.
9. Is Arbitral Discovery One-Sided?
Closely related to the fear that discovery procedures would be
subject to abuse is the fear that the procedures would function as a
one-sided remedy favoring unions at the expense of employers. The
most obvious response can be found in an analysis of the discovery
situations examined in Blind Man's Buff 4 in which it was to the
employer's advantage to gain discovery. But there is more to be said.
Traditionally, hostility to broader discovery has come from
management counsel who fear that unions will use discovery to compel
advance disclosure of management bargaining data. Employers are
naturally somewhat reluctant to share their negotiation data with
union bargainers-such disclosure would be greatly feared if unions
were permitted to launch inquisitive forays in the nature of discovery
quiz sessions, whether ancillary to court or to arbitral proceedings.
Despite this fear, there are significant advantages for both sides
in being able to bring to arbitration whatever discovery problems arise
in the course of administering the collective agreement. The union's
interest is more immediately evident than the employer's-perhaps it is
even more significant. Refusal to disclose will be a reaction more
common to employers, because, as the employment relationship normally
functions, the employer at the outset will generally possess more data
relevant to the grievance than are immediately available to the union.
This will often be of no particular consequence to the union, because
the events and reasons for the challenged action will be discussed by
the employer and union representatives during the grievance procedure.
But there are cases in which the employer is reluctant to make vol-
untary disclosure--cases in which the union must have disclosure if
it is to exercise its prerogatives both as the employees' representative
and as the contracting party. In those circumstances, it is irrelevant
to ask whether the employer will benefit from arbitral discovery. It is
enough that the need for disclosure exists.
Significantly, some employers have sought to steer discovery
efforts by unions into arbitration and away from section 8(a) (5)
charges. 75 This is a sound choice when the employer wishes not only
74 116 U. PA. L. Rxv. 571 (1968).
75See, e.g., NLRB v. Otis Elevator Co., 208 F.2d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 1953);
O'Brien, Should the NLRB Arbitrate Labor Contract Disputesf, 6 WAsHBURN L.J.
39 (1966).
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to avoid disclosure, but also to have the matter resolved as soon as
possible. Arbitration gives him a decision-maker whom he has had
some voice in selecting. But employers cannot exercise a preference
for arbitral discovery until that procedure is sanctioned by the NLRB
as well as the courts. For the employer, it would be ironic indeed if
the alleged one-sidedness of the remedy were a factor in preventing
that sanction.
Possibly management's greatest fear of the one-sidedness of
arbitral discovery rests on the assumption that it will result in "fishing
expeditions." " Some protection may be afforded if superintending
courts are willing to give real meaning to the concept of relevance.
Since federal law ultimately will be applicable to arbitral discovery by
way of section 301 of the LMRA,77 the "good cause" limitations of
Federal Rules 30(d) and 34 will be available to act as a check on
"fishing expeditions." 78
A related problem, that of unwarranted intrusion into counsel's
preparation of the case, may be somewhat illusory. The federal courts
have evolved elaborate rules to protect an attorney's "work product."
These rules will be available where the labor-management relationship
affects interstate commerce.79 Hickman v. Taylor8 o is the landmark
case dealing with discovery of the "work product of the lawyer." If
the material is protected by the attorney-client privilege it is not dis-
coverable. If it is not so protected, however, it may still be undiscover-
able under Hickman if it comprises "written statements, private memo-
randa and personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse
76 One management attorney described his fear as follows:
Due to the fact that there is a continuing relationship, there are all kinds
of grievance committees. You have those that are out looking for grievances,
who are continuously trying to drum them up. If you give them a right of
discovery, which they would like to have, and you let unsophisticated people
use this right of discovery, and maybe give an unsophisticated arbitrator the
right to award it, you are going to have them asking for information which,
by stretching, could be termed "relevant," but really is not. I have been on
some Labor Board cases where they asked for every record you owned, and
the Trial Examiner gave it to them because it had some little relevance.
So you have a committee or a local union president who says, "I want
this, this, this, and this," and it is relevant, but he wants it for more than one
reason. Or if he doesn't at the time want it for more than one reason, he sees
a lot of good reasons for having it once he has got it and it could certainly be
of use.
I would fight that to the death, I will tell you right now.
Problens of Proof in Labor Arbitration 225 (Proceedings of the 19th Ann. Meeting,
Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators, D. Jones ed. 1967).
7 LMRA 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
78 See WRIG1T, supra note 55, at 312.
79 State law is of no force except as it may be federalized by selective adoption.
See Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) ; Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448 (1957).
s0 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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party's counsel in the course of his legal duties." " But that reasoning
does not insulate all written materials obtained or prepared by a
lawyer in anticipation of litigation. Although one who seeks discovery
of a lawyer's "work product" bears the burden of making a substantial
showing of "necessity or justification," the Court concluded that "rele-
vant and non-privileged facts" will not be allowed to "remain hidden
in an attorney's file." s Yet so much of the work product as may re-
flect his mental impressions or opinions is, "for practical purposes,
absolutely immune from discovery." 3
The Court did not extrapolate the work-product rules to cover
materials obtained by persons other than attorneys. Although most
courts would probably agree that documents are not discoverable when
they reflect the impressions or opinions of non-lawyer investigators or
insurance claim agents, most cases have held that records of statements
obtained by them from witnesses are not entitled to work-product im-
munity. 4 Thus, statements elicited during grievance investigations by
union business representatives, shop stewards, industrial relations
managers or management staff personnel probably would be discover-
able, but their personal assessments of probable credibility and weight
to be given in a prospective arbitration would not be.
Although the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules proposed
in 1946 that the rules be amended to extend immunity to information
obtained by a party to an action or his agent,"5 there is as yet no such
immunity. Therefore, it is common to find that reports made to a
corporate party by its agents in the routine course of business are dis-
coverable."8 But such an approach is simplistic: the nature of the
document and the factual situation in the particular case should be
the determinants of work-product immunity. Thus, memoranda
accumulated in the course of the administration of a grievance procedure
during a contract term, for instance, even though antedating the par-
ticular grievance which occasions a discovery effort, should be entitled
to immunity because of the special nature of the process of grievance
settlement. Unlike one-shot court litigation, grievance administration
is a continuous process; a party's method of operation in grievance
administration is developed over a long period of time. Should a
party be forced to open its tactical files to discovery, its bargaining
position in future negotiations might be undermined. The result would
81 Id. at 510.
82d. at 511.
83 
WRGHT, mtpra note 55, at 314.
84 Id. at 314-16.
85 Id. at 316.
86 See Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparations in the Federal Courts, 50 CoLum.
L. R-v. 1026, 1039-41 (1950).
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be a serious impairment of the overall efficiency of the dispute resolution
process.
B. The Labor and Commercial Arbitral Processes-"Institutional
Competence" to Administer Discovery
The conclusion that discovery and labor arbitration are incom-
patible often appears to be based on a fallacious analogy to commercial
arbitration. This conclusion does not withstand analysis when applied
to labor-management grievance procedures.
The Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co.,8 7 pointed out the distinction between commercial and
labor arbitration processes:
[T]he run of arbitration cases . . . [is] irrelevant to our
problem. . . . In the commercial case, arbitration is the
substitute for litigation. Here arbitration is the substitute
for industrial strife. Since arbitration of labor disputes has
quite different functions from arbitration under an ordinary
commercial agreement, the hostility evinced by courts toward
arbitration of commercial agreements has no place here. For
arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agree-
ments is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process
itself.""
The parties to collective bargaining agreements do not merely
choose between trials in courts and proceedings before arbitrators.
Rather, the choice is between labor peace achieved through a tribunal
responsive to employer-employee grievances and labor unrest caused by
resolution of disputes through economic combat. Unlike the parties to
commercial arbitration, collective bargainers do not really have a
fundamental interest in avoiding procedural limitations. The election
of arbitration, as an alternative to strikes and lockouts, in no sense
warrants the perfunctory conclusion that a particular arbitral adaption
of legal procedures or doctrines, including discovery, is "inconsistent
87363 U.S. 574 (1960).
88 Id. at 578 (emphasis added). The Court compared the commercial and labor
arbitration processes in the following words:
Courts and arbitration in the context of most commercial contracts are re-
sorted to because there has been a breakdown in the working relationship of
the parties; such resort is the unwanted exception. But the grievance ma-
chinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very heart of the
system of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the means of solving
the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all the problems
which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way which will gen-
erally accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties. The proces-
sing of disputes through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by
which meaning and content are given to the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 581.
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with the desires of parties who refer their disputes to arbitrators rather
than to formal judicial tribunals." s
Discovery must be carefully administered in accordance with the
safeguards implicit in the Federal Rules and emphasized by the Court
in Hickman v. Taylor." For this reason the role of experienced counsel
is vital in judicial discovery. Professor Louisell, a close observer of
discovery, has cautioned that "[t] he utility, workability and success of
discovery will ultimately not be as much a function of threats and
sanctions as of its acceptance in reasonable fashion by the trial Bar." 0'
Can arbitral discovery be expected to function within those professional
boundaries? Is such professional guidance attainable if discovery
procedures are made available to labor arbitration participants? In
many of the foreseeable situations in which arbitral discovery would be
needed, lawyers would probably be representing the disputantsY2
But whatever our faith in the capabilities of the representative of
the parties-lawyers or laymen-it is evident that in our consideration
of the desirability of providing discovery in arbitration we must con-
stantly refer to the prudence of the arbitrator. A very wise and
perceptive federal judge, the late Charles E. Clark, observed of the
Federal Rules that, "[n]o procedure is better than the men who
operate it, while a comparatively poor procedure can be made to work
by good men. And so I have never thought much of the power of
abstract rules to make judges function better than their innate capacities
lead them to do." a
89Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. Rzv. 940, 943 (1961). How-
ever, legal acceptance of arbitral discovery must not result in the removal of discovery
disputes from arbitrators to courts. An apt formulation of a rule to govern the in-
teraction of labor arbitrators and courts in discovery situations was given by a New
York court in Katz v. Burkin, 3 App. Div2d 238, 160 N.Y.S2d 159 (1957):
Arbitration is subject to its own rules and practices at variance with court
procedures.... It would be generally incompatible with the nature and scope
of an arbitration proceeding to allow a shift to the court forum of that part of
a proceeding related to the prehearing examination of witnesses or collection
of evidence.
Id. at 239, 160 N.Y.S.2d at 160. The court went on to say that judicial intervention
should only be granted "under extraordinary circumstances such as the demonstrated
need for reaching a witness or evidence which is unavailable without a court order."
"Necessity rather than convenience should be the test." Id.
0 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
91 Louisell, Discovery Today, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 486, 511 (1957). Five years
earlier he had written, "Implicit in the discovery rules is acknowledgment that they
will be administered by a learned profession of judgment and integrity, which can be
depended upon for a high degree of self-discipline and self-policing." Louisell, Dis-
covery and Pre-Trial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 MINNr. L. REV. 633, 646 (1952).
92 Even without their attorneys, the parties are well accustomed to tactics em-
ployed to elicit information; they are fairly sophisticated. Most experienced arbitra-
tors, although unfamiliar with judicial discovery, would have no difficulty recognizing
and coping with overreaching attempts at bargaining advantage through demands for
information.
93 Clark, Pre-trial Orders and Pre-trial as a Part of Trial, 23 F.R.D. 506 (1958).
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Commercial arbitration is a process quite distinct from labor
arbitration, economically, psychologically and legally. To a great
extent those who function as arbitrators in nonlabor disputes serve in-
frequently and without compensation. The American Arbitration
Association has expressed the consequent reality thus:
As commercial arbitrators serve without fee in the typical
AAA case, they cannot usually be called upon more often than,
let us say, once or twice a year. It goes without saying that
such service does not give the businessman-arbitrator the
equivalent of a judge's or even a practicing lawyer's ex-
perience in resolving conflicts of evidence, distinguishing truth
from error in an adversary proceeding, and maintaining a
judicial atmosphere. 4
Professor Mentschikoff observes of the AAA that it "tries very hard
and very successfully not to have any one person sit as an arbitrator
more than once or twice a year." "
The major difference between commercial and labor arbitration,
then, is the composition of their respective corps of arbitrators. There
are nearly 20,000 persons identified as available for commercial arbitra-
tion in the United States, 18,000 of whom are on the AAA panel."
Most of them are never even called to sit on a case. The vast majority
of those who have been called will have encountered only a handful
of cases in their lifetimes. As knowledgeable as these men and women
undoubtedly are in regard to the activities which form the substance
94 Editorial, The "Hasards" of Commercial Arbitration, 17 ARB. J. (n.s.) 65, 66
(1962).
95 Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 CoLum. L. Rxv. 846, 857 (1961).
In the Chicago study of decision-making, a survey of trade associations produced
547 responses which disclosed that 34% of them indicated that their members made
individual arrangements for arbitration; 29% indicated that they used some type of
organized machinery, including the American Arbitration Association; and 26% re-
ported that their members never arbitrate. Of the 128 trade associations reporting
existence of institutionalized arbitration machinery, 73% indicated it was organized
and serviced by either the trade association itself, or by one of the four federated as-
sociations; 27% had arrangements with the AAA. The AAA administered commer-
cial cases totaling 677 in 1957; 711 in 1958; 707 in 1959; and 820 in 1960. Id. at 857.
Significant differences in practice exist as between the AAA and the self-contained
trade association groups' arbitration machinery: (1) under trade association machinery
there is "a continuity in the membership of the deciders ;" not so under the "casual
system" of the AAA, id. at 857; (2) precedents are common in the associations,
whereas the AAA "puts enormous pressure on its arbitrators not to write opinions,"
id. at 857; (3) the associations either explicitly discourage or forbid the use of attor-
neys (40%) or they "very rarely appear" (60%) whereas the AAA actively encour-
ages the use of attorneys, id. at 857; (4) the sanction for enforcing awards in the as-
sociations is internal discipline of the offending member whereas the AAA looks to
enforcement of awards by a court of competent jurisdiction, id. at 858; (5) "very few
of the [association] arbitrators are lawyers or law-trained" in contrast to about 30%
in AAA cases, id. at 859; (6) unlike the trade association machinery, AAA arbitrators
"in many cases" have "no peculiar expertise in the particular trade or business in-
volved in the dispute." Id. at 860.
96 S. LAzARus, J. BRAY, L. CARTER, K. CoLLiNs, B. GImDT, R. HOLTON, P. MAT-
THxws, G. WnILLAR, REsoLvING BusimEss DisPuTEs 23 (1965).
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of their careers, they typically have no practical experience whatsoever
in the problems of conducting hearings or in the intricacies of the
"judgematical" problem, the skeptical sifting of fact and argument in
the formulation of a judgment which will bind the disputants in an
adversary proceeding. Little wonder that judges and lawyers would
look aghast at the prospect of a single-case businessman-arbitrator
administering discovery procedures!
In contrast, labor arbitration is unique. Today there is a corps
of several hundred experienced labor arbitrators throughout the United
States hearing and deciding thousands of cases each year." These
persons have acquired experience because union and management
specialists in labor relations have repeatedly joined to ask them to
serve as their arbitrators. Their acceptability is based upon continuing
observation of their capacity to perform the functions desired by the
disputants. The National Academy of Arbitrators was organized in
1947 "to establish and foster high standards and competence among
those engaged in the arbitration of industrial disputes on a professional
basis." Its membership is composed of persons with "substantial and
current experience as . . . impartial arbitrator[s] of labor-management
disputes" or persons with "limited but current experience" who have
"attained general recognition through scholarly publication or other
activities as . . . impartial '[authorities] on labor-management rela-
tions." Also taken into account is a prospective member's "general
acceptability to the parties."" 8 The Academy numbers only about 350
members even though it has no in-group exclusionary policies. A 1962
Academy survey of arbitrators, covering 58 per cent of its membership,
revealed that the 158 respondents had decided 6279 cases in 1962, an
average of 39.8 per arbitrator.99 A 1964 survey pegged the average
at 40.1.1"' My own current survey of American labor arbitrators in-
dicates that there may be considerably fewer active arbitrators than
has generally been assumed, probably less than 450.
9 7 The AAA maintains a 1500-man labor arbitration panel nationally, but about
400-500 actually sit as arbitrators. The balance appear to have the requisite qualifi-
cations but apparently have not proved acceptable. FMCS General Counsel Morris
Myers has stated that 25% of the 1000 arbitrators on the FMCS roster get 75% of
the cases. There are men on the panel, again with the requisite qualifications, whose
names may be submitted 70 or 80 times a year without being accepted once by the
parties to a grievance dispute. This is all the more disappointing when one realizes
that these panels each require an existing measure of acceptance by labor and manage-
ment representatives plus, in the case of the FMCS, arbitral experience or prior in-
depth involvement in the process. Furthermore, there is "a substantial overlap between
the FMCS and AAA panels." 64 LAn. REL. R.EP. 341 (1967).9 SSee 1966-67 Membership Directory, National Academy of Arbitrators 2-4
(Statement of Academy Purposes and Aims, and Statement of Policy Relative to
Membership).
09 Labor Arbitration--Perspectives and Problemns, 17 NAT'L AcAD. OF A-B. PRO-
cEEDINGs 292, 295 (M. Kahn ed. 1964).
100 18 NAT'L AcAD. Or Am. PRoca=DiNGs 243, 244 (D. Jones ed. 1965).
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Thus a relatively small corps of experienced and acceptable, im-
partial persons handles the bulk of grievance cases. This is an im-
portant consideration in determining the availability of a federal
arbitral discovery remedy. It also confirms the Supreme Court's
reasoning in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.'
that
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply
the collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his in-
formed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of
a problem. This is especially true when it comes to formulat-
ing remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a
wide variety of situations.' 2
The wide experience of these labor arbitrators gives them expertise,
comprised of insight gathered from years of walking into plants they
have never before entered and reacting to people they have never
previously met, in order to hear, with varying degrees of formality and
vehemence, about kinds of disputes they will already have observed in
a variety of industrial contexts. Their experience is markedly unlike
that of the judge who sits in the routinized and formal atmosphere of
a courtroom into which the disputants come in awe and some trepida-
tion. It is also unlike that of the members of the National Labor
Relations Board for much the same reasons as apply to the courts.
The Labor Board sits in Washington. Its cases travel to Washington,
past the monuments and columns of the nation's capital, and arrive in
the vast masonry of federal government. In contrast, the arbitrator
drives out to the plant, or to some employer association or union hall
conference room. He rides circuit as did judges in the old American
tradition, bringing the apparatus of justice to the immediate locale in
which it has been invoked. On balance, this experience and exposure
to problems of industrial relations tends to confirm the conclusion that
arbitration provides the most direct access to collective bargaining dis-
covery administered by decision-makers likely to be informed and
sophisticated in dealing with the types of problems comprising the
discovery dispute.
Furthermore, Professor Mentschikoff has observed that:
[the] right to participate in and, in large measure, to control
the selection of arbitrators affords persons using the arbitral
procedure an enormous advantage over those using the
courts, since in the courts, within narrow limits of tactical
maneuvering, the parties have no say in the selection of the
judge who will try the caseY13
101363 U.S. 593 (1960).
10D2 Id. at 597.
103 Mentschikoff, supra note 95, at 863.
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Chief Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court
recently observed that "in the judiciary, as in every other walk of life,
a bad man is as hard to lose as a good man is hard to find." 10' The
legal practitioners in labor-management relations, the employer asso-
ciations and the international unions, keep themselves informed about
reputations, and an arbitrator stands for election each time he is con-
sidered by the parties for appointment. Incompetents become identified
in this professional environment and are ostracized.
Despite the industrial relations experience of most labor arbi-
trators, there are some who question whether theirs should be insulated
or enforceable decisions. Is it prudent to entrust discovery to arbi-
trators? Are they competent to discharge the responsibility involved?
In a curiously intemperate Storrs lecture at Yale,' 5 Judge Paul R.
Hays, erstwhile arbitrator and labor law professor, brusquely con-
demned (with almost no factual documentation and with an appalling
lack of concern for the individuals thus defamed en masse) all but an
unnamed "handful" 106 of arbitrators as "venal incompetents." Judge
Hays declared the "many fatal shortcomings" of labor arbitration to be
beyond repair by courts. Therefore, he concluded that "the courts
should not lend themselves at all to the arbitration process." 107 The
essence and tenor of his view may be gathered from the following:
In literally thousands of cases every year decisions are made
by arbitrators who are wholly unfitted for their jobs-who
do not have the requisite knowledge, training, skill, intelli-
gence and character.
A proportion of arbitration awards, no one knows how
large a proportion, is decided not on the basis of the evidence
or of the contract or other proper considerations, but in a way
which in the arbitrator's opinion makes it likely that he will
be hired for other arbitration cases.
. . . We know that a large proportion of the awards
of arbitrators are rendered by incompetents, that another
proportion-we do not know how large but are permitted by
the circumstances to suspect that it is quite large-is rendered
on the basis of what award would be best for the arbitrator's
future ....
1O4 Traynor, Who Can Best Judge the Judges? 42 CALIF. STATE B.J. 225, 238
(1967).
Lo5 p. HAYs, LABOR ARBITnATION: A DiSS-ING VIEW 112 (1966):
There are only a handful of arbitrators who, like Shulman and Cox, have the
knowledge, training, skill, and character which would make them good judges
and therefore make them good arbitrators.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 113.
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[L]abor arbitration is a usually undesirable and
frequently intolerable procedure. . 10"
Judge Hays made very little pretense of documenting his "we know"
assertions, or the "circumstances" which led him to such a dismal
view." 9 That both the labor arbitration process and the judicial process
need improvement is patent. They are human institutions. That
lOS Id at 113-14.
The charge that arbitrators generally are not qualified for that kind of task has
been fired from time to time over the centuries. Mr. Justice Story's observations in
1845 have already been noted. See notes 2-6 supra and accompanying text. In mar-
shalling his reasons for disapproving of arbitration, Mr. Justice Story cited a string
of English decisions to demonstrate that an agreement to refer a claim to arbitration
could not be specifically enforced. Yet only a decade later, Lord Campbell was suc-
cessfully urging the House of Lords in Scott v. Avery, 25 L.J. Exch. 308 (1856), to
take a contrary view of public policy. Plaintiff there argued in a contract action that
an insurance company could not assert as a defense that the matter had not yet been
submitted to arbitrators for determination of the amount of loss, as provided in the
contract of assurance. The contractual provision was argued to be an improper effort
to oust the courts of jurisdiction, and therefore void as against public policy.
Lord Campbell commented on the origin of the doctrine that parties could not by
contract oust the courts of their jurisdiction in favor of arbitration. The report of his
remarks on this aspect of the case is interesting:
There could be no injury to the public in an insurance company contracting
that no action should be brought against it, the costs of which might be
ruinous, but that every dispute should be referred to a domestic tribunal which
might speedily and economically determine the dispute. Public policy seemed
to him to require that such a contract should be enforced. If there were any
decisions the other way, he should ask their Lordships to reverse them as
contrary to principle. The doctrine had its origin in the interests of the
Judges. There was no disguising of the fact that, as formerly, the emoluments
of the Judges depended mainly, or almost entirely, upon fees, and as they had
no fixed salary there was a great competition to get as much as possible of
litigation into Westminster Hall, and a great scramble in Westminster Hall
for the division of the spoil .... And they had great jealousy of arbitrations
whereby Westminster Hall was robbed of those cases which came not into
the King's Bench, nor the Common Pleas, nor the Exchequer. Therefore they
said that the Courts ought not to be ousted of their jurisdiction, and that it
was contrary to the policy of the law to do so.
Id. at 313.
In an ironic turnabout of concern for the implications of the fee system, Judge
Hays has made the following observations:
A system of adjudication in which the judge depends for his livelihood, or
for a substantial part of his livelihood or even for substantial supplements to
his regular income, on whether he pleases those who hire him to judge is per se
a thoroughly undesirable system. In no proper system should a judge be
submitted to such pressures. On the contrary, a judge should be carefully
screened from any pressure of this type. There are many discussions of
arbitration which do not mention this aspect of the process. In my opinion no
discussion of arbitration that does not consider the effect of the arbitrator's
dependence on the good will of the parties is completely honest.
HAYS, mpra note 105, at 112-13.
109 The original publication, 74 YALE L.J. 1019 (1965), consisted only of the last
of the three lectures and contained no documentation whatsoever. Although Judge
Hays did attempt to muster support for his assertions when the lectures were published
in book form, supra note 105, he himself admitted that there was a "surprising lack
of objective factual studies of the arbitration process." Id. at 38. As a result, he
could support one of his major assertions-that a prediction of how an arbitrator will
decide the issue is the sole basis for his selection-only by quoting the answer given
by "only one client" to a question propounded in a survey done twenty years ago.
Id. at 39.
That Judge Hays had unpleasant experiences as an arbitrator is unquestionable.
His arguments, however, are clearly based almost entirely on these few experiences.
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attempts at reform are necessary is obvious. But to condemn an
institution widely and voluntarily accepted is neither sound scholarship
nor fair judging.
If labor arbitrators were typically the venal men of Judge Hays'
recollection they certainly should not be entrusted with any functions
of a judicial nature, let alone discovery. For that matter, they should
be ousted from collective bargaining entirely to protect its integrity.
But with a kind of pox-on-you attitude toward bargainers foolish
enough to arbitrate, Judge Hays oddly appeared willing to tolerate
arbitrators so long as their awards just stayed out of court. The
labor-management community and their lawyers, however, are tough-
minded men, competent and interested enough to spot an avaricious
or stupid arbitrator and to eliminate him from the process. Judge
Hays thinks uniformly well neither of those who do the selecting nor
of those who are selected. The judgment of the selectors obviously
must be reflected in the men and women they select as their arbitrators.
There are inept arbitrators. There are also inept judges. At least in
voluntary arbitration the disputants are empowered to jointly accept
or reject their own decision-maker. Typcially, they also divide his fee
evenly between them (or sometimes assess it against the loser) so
neither has a peculiar call on his judgment in the particular case. One
who seeks to please the party with the greater number of future
arbitrations at his dispensation is truly to be pitied because his chances
of success at venality are minimal. Unlike the incompetent judge, the
venal or incompetent arbitrator is readily removable from circulation.
A judge may be "unacceptable" to a litigant for any one of a number
of reasons. But, except in rare circumstances, judge he remains of
that case.
Whatever it was that Judge Hays experienced, observed, or heard
about, it clearly scandalized him. Were a pattern thereby indicated,
we would surely want to determine whether we were confronted with
the inherent weaknesses of an institution (and should therefore with-
draw our support from it) or with isolated personal venality, not in-
validating the institution so much as the man. Unfortunately, he dis-
closes neither source nor circumstance. We may assume that something
or some things happened and that the situation was deplorable, since
it manifestly shocked an honorable man. The point is, however, that
we are assessing an institution of demonstrated utility; there is simply
no evidence in the public record of anything other than an occasional
unsubstantiated rumor indicating the possibility of isolated instances
While properly pointing out the need for more factual studies of the process, his lec-
tures serve primarily as an illustration of a point he himself makes-that one who
writes about arbitration only from his own experiences of the process should be wary
of broad generalization from his own limited viewpoint. See id. at 38.
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of venality; there is only the unsubstantiated, blanket condemnation
of Judge Hays.
In contrast, Professors Dallas Jones and Russell Smith have con-
ducted an enlightening study of the attitudes of disputants and ad-
vocates toward the labor arbitration process."' Given the choice of
leaving all issues of contract application to the courts, to bargaining
inclusive of strike action or to arbitration, an "overwhelming ma-
jority" of those surveyed preferred arbitration."' Not a single union
official questioned preferred either courts or bargaining to arbitration." 2
And although several union lawyers did prefer strikes to arbitration,
none wanted to litigate."3 Indeed, only five per cent of the management
respondents, including lawyers, indicated a preference for a method
other than arbitration. 4
These are crucial findings. There are pointed criticisms of labor
arbitration, notably of felt procedural deficiencies concerning conduct
of the hearing, rules of evidence, legalisms, reviewability, the need for
new faces, delays, cost and, most prominently, the quality of the
experience of arbitrators. Yet the general acceptance of arbitration
among those who voluntarily resort to it means that the Justices of
the Supreme Court who are continuously strengthening the jurisdiction
and the authority of labor arbitrators accurately perceive the realities
felt by those who participate in the process.
What has been sought in arbitration is the element of informed
judgment which it can provide. That judgment is developed by ex-
posure to the problems of a number of different situations and
employer-union relationships. The experienced arbitrator develops a
capacity to grasp the varying needs, problems, desires and aversions
of employers, unions and workers.
In considering the use of discovery procedures administered by
arbitrators, it should be remembered that many labor arbitrators are
not lawyers. However, this need not present an insurmountable
problem: the functional character of the non-lawyer arbitrator's ex-
perience and judgment equip him to exercise a sound discretion in the
cases he handles. The intrusive character of a remedy resulting in
114 Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbi-
tration Process: A Report with Comments, 62 MicH. L. Rmr. 1115 (1964).
11d. at 1116.
1Id. at 1117.
113 Id.
1-Id. at 1116-17.
A substantial number of our respondents not only prefer arbitration over
the other available alternatives, but also indicate they are generally satisfied
with the arbitration process as they now find it, and offer no suggestions for
its improvement. On the other hand, many, although generally of the opinion
that arbitration is the best of the viable alternatives, indicate dissatisfactions of
various kinds, and hold that the process can and should be improved.
Id. at 1118.
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unwilling disclosure would obviously be a highly sensitive issue to
either an employer or a union. A law degree would not seem to be
a prerequisite to an understanding of the sensitivity and importance
of the problem. If errors in judgment will be made in arbitral dis-
covery, it seems as likely that they will be made by lawyer as by layman
arbitrators, and as many non-lawyers are likely to err on the side of
denying recovery as on the side of granting it without cause. There
is little doubt that discovery would be sparingly granted by arbitrators,
whether lawyers or not.
We have been considering the concerns and possible objections
which might attend the acceptance of arbitral discovery. We have
found that it is a remedy which is compatible with collective bargaining
and that it can be structured to provide its administration with adequate
safeguards. We turn now to an analysis of the implications to arbitral
discovery of the various legal doctrines radiating from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Taft-Hartley Act, the United States
Arbitration Act and other sources of applicable national policy.
III
THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF ARBITRAL DISCOVERY
Professor Louisell has observed that the prospect of discovery in
arbitration proceedings "raises fundamental questions as to the nature
of arbitration in relation to the total adjudicatory process." "" So it
does, but it is important to bear in mind that arbitration comprehends
several processes, only one of which is responsive to collective bargain-
ing disputes. As we have seen, the legal and economic incidents
attributable to labor arbitration can only be derived in relation to the
economic and political policies which sustain the processes of collective
bargaining-the basic national mechanism for allocating and adminis-
tering the economic benefits of the production of goods and services in
major segments of our economy. The need is constant for pragmatic
appraisals of the contemporary problems of collective bargaining so
that arbitral techniques may be made responsive to them.
A. The Development of Modern Discovery
Modern discovery has been almost as dramatic in the pace of its
development as has labor arbitration. It was only in 1924 that Mr.
Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, denounced as "con-
trary to the first principles of justice" the allowance of "a search
through all the respondents' records, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope
that something will turn up." "' Invoking the fourth amendment's
15 D. LOUISELL, MODERN CALIFORNIA DiscovERY 19 (1963).
116 F.T.C. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).
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prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, he declared that it
would "sweep all our tradition into the fire" were "fishing expeditions
into private papers" to be tolerated."'
1. The Hickman Rationale
Yet less than a quarter of a century later it was as emphatically
declared by a unanimous Court in Hickman v. Taylor "I' that "No
longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude
a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case." 19
The writer, Mr. Justice Murphy, was one of the Court's most devoted
civil libertarians, sensitive indeed to the safeguards of the Bill of Rights.
The Court hailed "the vital role in the preparation for trial" of the
recently adopted "deposition-discovery process" of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 20 Mr. Justice Murphy declared that the "broad
and liberal treatment" " to be accorded the new rules meant that
"civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the
dark." '1 The "various instruments of discovery" would enable the
narrowing and clarifying of the issues between the parties. "To that
end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he
has in his possession." '2 Disclosure occurs in the course of a trial
in any event. The deposition-discovery procedure "simply advances
the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of
trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility of surprise."
Of course, discovery "is not a one-way proposition," available to or
favoring only one class of litigants. "It is available at the behest of
any party, individual or corporate, plaintiff or defendant." '
As with all matters of procedure, however, discovery "has ultimate
and necessary boundaries." ' These are the safeguards contained in
rules 30(b) and (d) and 31 (d) which are designed to preclude bad
faith, annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression of the person sub-
jected to discovery. Rule 26(b) curbs inquiry into the irrelevant or
the realm of privileged silence.
The resistance to more effective discovery has been quite stubborn
throughout. Wigmore concluded that the English common law judges
111 Id.
,is 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
"l9 Id. at 507.
120 Id. at 501.
12 Id. at 507.
122 Id. at 501.
im Id, at 507.
124 Id.
125 Id.
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resisted it because disclosure to an adversary was "repugnant to all
sportsmanlike instincts," " related to the British addiction to the card
game of whist which protected the player from exposing his cards
before playing them. Another commentator saw the element of surprise
so long cherished by the common law as "the psychological child of
trial by battle." 17
Whatever the reason, it has certainly been true that there has been
a deep fear of liberalizing discovery. Hostility to "fishing expeditions"
before trial was finally only overcome by favorable experiences with
discovery. The attraction of the sporting theory of justice has conse-
quently, in recent years, been considerably dissipated. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter once stated that "[1]itigation is the pursuit of practical
ends, not a game of chess." 28 After a quarter century of federal dis-
covery, studies indicate that it is "extremely popular with the bar." 129
Modern discovery procedures are recognized to have contributed
to the efficient functioning of the judicial system in several ways.
Discovery has helped to narrow the area of controversy, thereby causing
settlements and reducing the prospect of unfair surprises.
2. Arbitral Discovery Among the States
The liberality of federal discovery rules has had a significant
impact on state deposition rules and statutes. But in the twenty-nine
years since their adoption, less than half the states have modeled their
deposition-discovery procedures on the Federal Rules. Although Judge
Charles E. Clark in 1958 saw a "trend of state adoption . . . pro-
ceeding apace," 130 consideration of the arbitral utility of discovery must
reckon with the existence in a substantial number of states of disparate
discovery practices in the federal and state courts, quite aside from
special provisions made for arbitration.
Arbitration statutes have been enacted by most states. 3 ' Many
of the states have conferred on the arbitrator the power to issue sub-
poenas 132 and to administer oaths. 3" Depositions for discovery pur-
1266 J. WIamoRE, EviDENcE § 1845 at 375 (3d ed. 1940).
=7G. RAGLAND, DiscovERY BEFoRE TRIAL 264 (1932).
M Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941).
129 Wright, Wegner & Richardson, The Practicing Attorney's View of the Utility
of Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 97 (1952). See notes 55-59 supra and accompanying text.
130 Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rides, 58 CoLum. L. REV. 435 (1958).
1
3 1 E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 150C, §3 (1965); N. H. Rlv. STAT. ANN.
§ 542:6 (1955) ; W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 21-1A12 (1966).
132E.g, ALA. CODF tit. 7, § 837 (1958) ; CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-412 (1958);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 325.01 (1958).
133 E.g., AaRz. RE V. STAT. ANN. § 12-1507 (Supp. 1966) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10,
§ 107 (Smith-Hurd 1966) ; N. Y. Cry. PRAc. LAW § 7505 (McKinney 1963).
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poses are enabled in some states; 1"4 but others enable the taking of
depositions only "for use as evidence." 135
In contrast to Federal Rule 26, the present California arbitration
statute limits the use of depositions for discovery purposes in arbitra-
tion. An arbitrator "may order the deposition of a witness to be
taken for use as evidence and not for discovery." 13 This is so even
though California in 1957 became one of those jurisdictions embracing
the more liberal federal procedures. 13 7 Although the California legis-
lature substantially adopted the language of the Federal Rules, it did
not copy them verbatim. Instead, it made quite a few alterations,
broadening the scope of discovery. "The importance of those altera-
tions," the Supreme Court of California observed in 1961 in Greyhound
Corp. v. Superior Court,138 "is that almost without exception they were
made for the express purpose of creating in California a system of
discovery procedures less restrictive than those then employed in the
federal courts." "'
The California court quoted ' 4 Professor Louisell's comment that
"a law suit should be an intensive search for the truth, not a game to
be determined in outcome by consideration of tactics and surprise ...
[T]he deposition-discovery rules . . . minimize the chances for and
significance of the trick tactic . . . [and] enhance the value of
thorough and penetrating advocacy." 141 Applying that standard to
the restrictive arbitral discovery statute, Louisell concludes that it is
"an additional hiatus in modern California discovery." 142
At this point, the reasoning of the California court in this non-
labor case affords a useful summary of the goals of discovery, whether
in arbitration or the courts. The court saw the liberalized system as
intended to accomplish the following results:
(1) to give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining
the truth and in checking and preventing perjury; (2) to
provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false,
fraudulent and sham claims and defenses; (3) to make avail-
able, in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which
otherwise could not be proved except with great difficulty;
134 E.g., NF-v. Rav. STAT. § 38.120 (1957).
'35 E.g., CALIF. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1283 (West Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 57.17 (Supp. 1966) ; OHIo REv. CODE: ANN. § 2711.07 (Page 1954).
136 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1283 (West 1954).
137 Id. § 2016.
138 56 Cal.2d 355, 364 P.2d 266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961).
539 Id. at 375, 364 P.2d at 274, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
140 Id. at 375, 364 P.2d at 275, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
141 Louisell, Discovery and Pre-Trial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN. L.
REv. 633, 639 (1952).
142 D. LouisaLt, MODERN CALIFORNIA DiscovERY 17-18 (1963).
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(4) to educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real
value of their claims and defenses, thereby encouraging
settlements; (5) to expedite litigation; (6) to safeguard
against surprise; (7) to prevent delay; (8) to simplify and
narrow the issues; and (9) to expedite and facilitate both
preparation and trial.'43
We turn now to a consideration of the national labor laws to
determine how arbitral discovery may square with them and whether
federal law, operating through the constitutional doctrine of federal-
state preemption, may be said to have replaced the welter of state
arbitral discovery systems with the uniformity of a federal arbitral
discovery remedy.
B. The Taft-Hartley Act and Arbitral Discovery
No federal procedures for discovery in labor arbitration are ex-
pressly provided for in the Taft-Hartley Act.'44 Several sections, how-
ever, are relevant. Section 203 (d) makes the basic policy declaration
that
[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties
is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement
143 Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Ct, 56 Ca.?d 355, 377, 364 P.2d 266, 275, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 90, 99 (1961).
144 There have been unsuccessful efforts to obtain inter-party discovery in other
federal administrative proceedings. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 555 (Supp. II 1966), and the statutes creating the various federal agencies, those
such as the NLRB have the power to issue subpoenas and to take depositions and can
compel disclosures in proceedings initiated by them. Of the "big seven" regulatory
agencies, five have rules sufficiently ambiguous to permit depositions to be taken for
discovery purposes. (F.P.C.) 18 C.F.R. §§ 1-24(a), (b) (1961); (F.T.C.) 16 C.F.R.
§ 3.10(a) (Supp. 1964) ; (I.C.C.) 49 C.F.R. § 11.57(a) (1963) ; (N.L.R.B.) 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.30(a) (1963) ; (S.E.C.) 17 C.F.R. § 201.15(a) (Supp. 1963). All but the F.T.C.
require a showing of good cause. But the APA, as typically construed in the rules of
the federal agencies, "fails to provide an administrative litigant with much assistance
in his quest for discovery." Note, 16 STAN. L. Rxv. 1035, 1043-44 (1964). As Pro-
fessor Kenneth Culp Davis has observed, "[p]robably no sound reason can be given
for failure to extend to administrative adjudications the discovery procedures worked
out for judicial proceedings." K. DAvis, ADmimISTRATivE LAw 589 (1958). See also,
Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings, 46 A.B.A.J. 74 (1960); Frank-
hauser & Belman, The Right to Information in the Administrative Process: A Look
at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 18 AD. L. REv. 101 (1966).
The California Supreme Court, in the face of a similar problem, adopted a more
candid approach and reached a sounder result in its unanimous decision in Shively v.
Stewart, 65 Cal2d 475, 421 P.2d 65, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1966). Confronted with legis-
lative silence with respect to the availability of pre-hearing discovery in an administra-
tive proceeding, Chief justice Traynor stated flatly, "We are committed to the wisdom
of discovery.. .," id. at 479, 421 P.2d at 68, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 220, and concluded that
the silence of the legislature did not mean a rejection by it of pre-hearing discovery
in administrative proceedings. "Instead, . . . it has left to the courts the question
whether modern concepts of administrative adjudication call for common law rules to
permit and regulate the use of the agencies' subpoena power to secure pre-hearing
discovery." Id. at 479, 421 P.2d at 67, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 219. As the chief justice
observed, "statutory administrative procedures have been augmented with common law
rules whenever it appeared necessary to promote fair hearings and effective judicial
review." Id.
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of grievance disputes arising over the application or inter-
pretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement.Y45
Sections 8(a) (5) ' and 8(b) (3) 147 establish the requirement of
good faith bargaining on the part of employers and unions respectively,
and section 8(d) requires that they
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question
arising thereunder, . . . but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of
a concession. 48
Finally, under section 9(a), a union selected by a majority of the
employees becomes the representative of all workers in the bargaining
unit.149
1. From Lincoln Mills to Acme Industrial
In 1957 the Supreme Court concluded in Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills 0 that section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act 181 em-
powered the federal courts to fashion a body of law for the enforcement
of collective agreements. "The rule that will best effectuate the federal
policy" was to be drawn "from the policy of our national labor laws,"
and, if drawn from state law, the rule "will be absorbed as federal law
and will not be an independent source of private rights." 12 In later
cases, the Court has noted that the arbitrator is vested with responsi-
bility for rulemaking responsive to the special needs of collective bar-
gaining, because he "performs functions which are not normal to the
courts; the considerations which help him fashion judgments may
indeed be foreign to the competence of courts." 183 "The ablest judge
cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence to
bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be
similarly informed." 184 The arbitrator's contractual rulemaking power
145LLMRA 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964). That policy was articulated earlier in
§ 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 which denies injunctive relief to any com-
plainant "who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either
by negotiation... or voluntary arbitration." 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1964).
146 NLRA 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
147 LMRA 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1964).
148 LMRA 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
149 The Supreme Court and the Board have interpreted these statutory provisions
as creating an obligation of disclosure on the part of the employer in the course of the
administration of the grievance procedure contained in a collective agreement See
Blind Maz's Buff, suipra note *, at 578-86.
150 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
151 LMRA 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
152 Id. at 457.
153 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
154 Id. at 582.
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understandably extends to the "'procedural questions' which grow out
of the dispute and bear on its final disposition." '
The question arises, however, whether section 301 as read by the
Court in Lincoln Mills equips labor arbitrators with the same remedial
aids, and subjects them to the same procedural safeguards, irrespective
of the particular remedial scheme of the state in which the arbitration
occurs. Arbitrators must frequently cross state lines in order to
function. Substantial advantages would accrue if arbitrators and
courts concerned with exercising the "judicial inventiveness" man-
dated by Lincoln Mills need only focus on one set of federal legal
principles. 5 ' They would be thereby free to develop expertise and to
work out flexible ground rules for each particular arbitration problem.
The uncertainties created by non-uniformity ought not to afflict labor
arbitration if avoidance is at all possible.
It is reasonable to conclude, in view of the evolution of the inter-
pretation of section 301, that arbitrators possess the power to issue
binding discovery orders under federal law preemptive of state law.
This includes the power of subpoena, deposition-discovery, and ad-
ministration of the testimonial oath. The power exists when a party
to a collective agreement, anticipating the need for enforcement of
discovery procedures, seeks an order in a state or federal court to
compel arbitration under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. The
discovery remedies of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be
deemed to become operative upon filing to secure that enforcement
order, regardless of whether a later court order specifically authorizes
the use of discovery procedures in the arbitration and irrespective of
whether the court is state or federal.
In all but a handful of grievance disputes, the parties may avoid
the necessity of judicial intervention under section 301 by agreeing
to submit procedural differences to an arbitrator for resolution. Their
arbitration proceeds under the aegis of section 301 whether or not
formally invoked by a party to the collective agreement through the
institution of a court suit. Questions of power and propriety are re-
solved in either event under federal law. Federal law determines the
extent of the arbitrator's powers, including those of subpoena, deposi-
tion, and administration of an oath.
155 John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964).
156 In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), the Court reviewed its preemption doc-
trines. It distinguished two lines of evolution stemming from the Taft-Hartley Act,
"the Garnion line of decision," referring to San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959), and section 301 suits. As to the latter, "Garmon and like cases
have no application.... " 384 U.S. at 184. Whereas the Garntwn doctrine allocates
jurisdiction either to the state or federal forum, the section 301 cases have allowed the
states a concurrent jurisdiction to apply the federal law evolved under section 301
pursuant to the Linwoln Mills mandate.
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Section 301, not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is the
funnel for this federal power. The instrument of federalization in labor
dispute arbitration is the congressional mandate of section 301 as
construed by the Court in Lincoln Mills. This description of pro-
cedural preemption relative to the immediate administration of labor
arbitration can be regarded either as a proposal for judicial inventive-
ness or as an attempt to define an existing state of law. It would be
more realistic to view it, however, as a blend of definition and anticipa-
tion inherent in an effort to prepare the ground for an act of judicial
lawmaking.
The Supreme Court, in its Lincoln Mills-Wiley line of decisions,
has developed a rationale of rulemaking for the interaction of arbi-
trators and courts. In Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.1. 7 and in
the recent decision in NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.,158 it has strongly
supported cooperative interaction between labor arbitrators and the
Board. Lincoln Mills called upon the courts to exercise a "range of
judicial inventiveness that will be determined by the nature of the
problem." 1"9 That mandate must be read in light of the Court's subse-
quent emphasis, in the Steelworkers trilogy, upon the particular cast
of judgment of arbitrators and upon the inevitability of a functional
relationship between them and the courts.' 6°
The evolution of the remedy of arbitral discovery, in its turn, fits
into the federal scheme of tribunal interaction initiated by Lincoln Mills.
Acme Industrial 6' has committed to the NLRB the task of dove-
tailing its procedures with those of arbitration, but the Board by no
means has an unfettered discretion. In NLRB v. C & C Plywood
Corp.,62 a case involving a collective bargaining agreement without an
arbitration clause, 68 the Supreme Court noted the significance of the
congressional determination to withhold a "general jurisdiction over all
alleged violations of collective bargaining agreements" from the Board
and to confer it on the courts under section 301. To have conferred
on the Board the "generalized power to determine the rights of parties
under all collective agreements would have been a step toward govern-
157375 U.S. 261 (1964).
158 385 U.S. 432 (1967). See Blind Mai's Buff, supra note *, at 578.
159 353 U.S. at 457.
160 See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ; United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
161 NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). See Blind Man' Buff,
supra note *, at 578.
162385 U.S. 421 (1967).
163 Id. at 426. Therefore, the Board's interpretation of the agreement in C & C
Plywood "was in no way inconsistent with its previous recognition of arbitration as
'an instrument of national labor policy for composing contractual differences'"
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mental regulation of the terms of those agreements." 164 Moreover,
"Congress was also concerned with the possibility of conflicting de-
cisions that would result from placing all questions of contract inter-
pretation before both the Board and the courts." 165 Of course, where
there is a collectively bargained arbitration provision and discovery is
sought, there is a very real possibility of precisely that kind of conflict
of decision between the Board's disclosure rulings under section
8(a) (5) and the arbitrator's discovery decisions which are necessarily
enforceable and reviewable in the courts under the protective provisions
of rule 30(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That possi-
bility is absent, however, in a case like C & C Plywood because the
only route to court is through interpretation of an arbitration provision,
((since courts have no jurisdiction to enforce the union's statutory
rights under §§ 8(a) (5) and (1)." 166
As the Supreme Court pointed out:
[I]n this case the Board has not construed a labor agreement
to determine the extent of the contractual rights which were
given the union by the employer. It has not imposed its own
view of what the terms and conditions of the labor agreement
should be. It has done no more than merely enforce a
statutory right which Congress considered necessary to allow
labor and management to get on with the process of reaching
fair terms and conditions of employment-'"to provide a
means by which the agreement may be reached." The Board's
interpretation went only so far as was necessary to determine
that the union did not agree to give up these statutory safe-
guards. Thus, the Board, in necessarily construing a labor
agreement to decide this unfair labor practice case has not
exceeded the jurisdiction laid out for it by Congress.
16 7
If arbitrators have the power to administer discovery in conjunction
with the enforcement and protective jurisdiction of the courts, the
Board will then be brought face to face with the inhibiting rationale
expressed by the Court in that cautionary passage which is addressed
to the Board as much as to the courts.
This is so despite the Court's decision in Acme Industrial that
the statutory obligation to furnish information is enforceable by the
Board even when a collectively bargained arbitration provision exists.
The Court there rejected a dogmatic exclusion of Board jurisdiction
"requiring the Board's deference to an arbitrator when construction
164 Id. at 427.
165 Id. at 428 n.13.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
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and application of a labor agreement are in issue." 168 There un-
doubtedly will be cases, as observed elsewhere in this study,"* where
the Board ought to be able to assert its jurisdiction despite the avail-
ability of arbitration. If, for instance, the information sought is not
really vital and the cost of arbitration would be an undue burden to
a small employer or local union, perhaps the Board's experienced investi-
gative staff and more extended but cost-free procedures should be
available for a party. Acme Industrial has enabled the Board to make
that kind of particularized response to the necessities of each case. Such
a rule reflects sound judicial administration on the part of the Court.
But, as the Court realized in both C & C Plywood and Acme Industrial,
it demands equally sound administration by the Board.
Acme Industrial has recognized the "arbitrator's greater institu-
tional competency" 170 in the court-arbitrator sequence established in
the Steelworkers trilogy as compared with that of the Board. The role
of the Board is complicated, in part, by its responsibility to administer
the policies embodied in sections 8(a)(5), 8(d) and 10(a) of the
National Labor Relations Act, and, in part, by the fact that arbitrators
daily dispose of hundreds of grievances involving acts protected or
prohibited by the act which (although this is atypical) may be brought
to the Board despite their awards.
The Court has stated that the Board's 8(a) (5) order to disclose,
"[flar from intruding upon the preserve of the arbitrator, . . . was
in aid of the arbitral process;" the "discovery-type standard" applied
by the Board was described as simply a "threshold determination con-
cerning the potential relevance of the requested information" and "de-
cided nothing about the merits of the Union's contractual claims." 171
But what of the employer's contractual claims? Is he not entitled to
rely on a nonstatutory, contractual procedure for the prompt face-to-
face resolution of disputes like this one? As the Court reminds us in
Acme Industrial, "the grievance procedure is . . . a part of the con-
tinuous collective bargaining process." 1 2 As such, it is a negotiated
benefit of considerable economic substance when set against the heavy
burden in time and money imposed on a party compelled to respond to
an NLRB charge.
There is no reason for the Board to be jealous of its prerogatives
in this kind of case. C & C Plywood and Acme Industrial repeatedly
emphasize the need for a flexible procedure of interaction between the
168 Id. at 435.
6
9 Id. at 436.
170Id. at 437-38.
171Id. at 437 n.3, quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363
U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
172 385 U.S. at 439.
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Board and arbitration. The conclusion in Acme Industrial that the
Board's 8 (a) (5) order "was consistent both with the express terms of
the Labor Act and with the national labor policy favoring arbitration
." will prove sound if the Board, instead of relying on the failure
to invoke arbitration, commits run-of-the-mill contractual disclosure
cases to arbitration as a first resort. Board procedures could then be
utilized in those cases where governmental presence is needed as a
catharsis or as a more effective discovery mechanism.
The relative flexibility available to the Board and to arbitrators
can be seen by considering the prospects of a union in an Acme Indtus-
trial discovery situation. There the employer had moved out ma-
chinery and refused to answer reasonable inquiries by the union con-
cerning its disposition. In order to get the withheld information the
union was compelled either to go to arbitration or to seek the Board's
intervention. It misguidedly chose the Board, running the risk that
information which was vital to the union at the outset would be useless
by the time the Board could be expected to get its disclosure order
enforced many months later. Moreover, the federal circuit courts may
(and often do) disagree with the Board's views, either on the sig-
nificance of the facts before them or on the propriety of the substantive
doctrines or remedial procedures adopted by the Board. 7 ' Thus, if
the employer does not voluntarily comply, the union will also have to
run the reviewing gauntlet of the court before it can get the disclosure
ordered by the Board a number of months earlier. Mr. Justice Stewart
has posed the prospect that the "expense of arbitration might be placed
upon the union only for it to learn that the machines had been relegated
to the junk heap." "7 And what of the cost of delay to those employees
who might be on layoff ? Does federal law require them to submit to
that greater expense despite their contractual claim to prompt dis-
closure? What the union eventually has obtained from the Supreme
Court is enforcement of the Board's order some four years after it was
needed. Now, at last, it will learn whether the employer's refusal to
disclose has all along been simply a joke. The employer has known
the answer all along; he has just refused to tell. That kind of refusal
deserves an adequate response.
How would arbitration have been better suited to the union's
needs? The arbitrator certainly could have ordered disclosure in a
matter of weeks, thus relieving the union of the burden of waiting well
173 It should not make any difference whether a party has or has not invoked
arbitration. Instead, the question is whether it makes good sense under the labor act
to require the charging party to exhaust voluntarily accepted contractual procedures
before allowing it to summon the other party involuntarily to a statutory proceeding
at considerable cost in money and time and contrary to its bargain.
174 385 U.S. at 438-39.
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over a year for the Board to act.'7 5 But assuming that the collective
agreement contained a typical provision dividing the costs of an arbitra-
tion equally between the parties, what if the union cannot afford the
expense of arbitration? In that unconscionable situation would it not be
proper for the arbitrator to order the willfully withholding party to pay
the cost incurred by the union in securing the information? A number
of arbitrators would have no qualms about assessing that employer for
the expenses, including attorney's fees and the direct costs of the arbi-
tration, which were incurred by the union upon a finding that the
refusal to disclose had violated the agreement. And even arbitrators
who feel more constrained by the contractual provision for dividing the
cost of arbitration still might be willing to assess damages against the
withholder of information because of the egregious nature of the
conduct. Most would want to be assured, of course, that the with-
holder was not somehow acting in good faith reliance on the absence,
in the circumstances, of an obligation to disclose.'7
Judicial enforcement under section 301 of this kind of assessment
of costs linked to the disclosure award should present no problem. It is
apparent that this employer has breached the condition of good faith
compliance implicit in any contract, but particularly in a collective
bargaining relationship between parties statutorily bound as a matter
of national policy to bargain in good faith with each other. This is
the kind of discretion in the fashioning of arbitral remedies, responsive
to industrial reality, that the Court sought to insulate from judicial
displacement in the Steelworkers trilogy."' Such an order should be
judicially enforceable under section 301.
2. Hoosier Cardinal and the Need for Uniformity
In 1966, the Supreme Court held in UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal
Corp..7' that the statutory timeliness of a suit brought under section 301
175 See text accompanying note 27 supra.
176 The Board's doctrines are so clear and consistent over the years on the duty
to disclose, that one may well question whether it would be reasonable to excuse a
party for "good faith" ignorance on a matter so firmly imbedded in the law. After
all, the common sense of collective bargaining, even were it technically in good faith,
would prompt disclosure without the need for contractual or statutory enforcement.
Realistically, most cases of refusal to disclose involve parties motivated by antago-
nism. This author hastens to grant (indeed, to defend) the right of a collective bar-
gainer to engage in adversary tactics; but, it is nonetheless true that the bargaining
party who engages in such tactics can hardly cry surprise if he has to pay the cost
for a tactical error in assessing how far he can properly press an adversary advantage
under the contract.
1'77 See note 160 supra. The question how the availability of an arbitral remedy
should affect the Board's disposition of refusals to disclose, upon the arbitral discovery
order coupled with an assessment of costs against the withholder receiving judicial
sanction, will be analyzed in the third and final article in this study.
178 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
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shall be governed by the applicable state statute of limitations. The
Court had earlier observed the need for uniformity, in Teamsters Local
174 v. Lucas Flour Co.,1" foreseeing that "possible conflicting legal
concepts might substantially impede the parties' willingness to agree
to contract terms providing for final arbitral or judicial resolution of
disputes." ' But in Hoosier Cardinal the Court did not find varying
state statutes of limitations a disturbing prospect, 8 ' since lack of uni-
formity is "unlikely to frustrate in any important way the achievement
of any significant goal of labor policy." 'M
Our concern here is to assess the impact of Hoosier Cardinal on
the fashioning of arbitral discovery under section 301. How is the
Supreme Court apt to view one of the major devices-deposition-
discovery? In Hoosier Cardinal, the Court rejected any sterile exercise
in affixing labels. It declined to inquire whether statutes of limitation
are "substantive" or "procedural," "primary" or "remedial," in order to
reach its decision."s Instead, it approached the problem in terms of the
need of collective bargaining administration for a uniform rule. The
Court applied the usual rule that where federal statutes create a right
of action without stating the time within which such action must be
brought, state statutes of limitations should be applied. It rejected the
view of the dissenters that Lincoln Mills required a uniform rule of
limitation *184
The majority identified the need for uniformity as greatest "where
its absence would threaten the smooth functioning of those consensual
processes that federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote." 185
Since statutes of limitations "come into play only when these processes
have already broken down," it saw no need for uniformity."8 6 This was
simply not one of those "problems so vital to the implementation of
federal labor policy that they will command a high degree of inventive-
ness from the courts." 18
Resort to discovery within the context of arbitration, however,
cannot be regarded as a symptom of any breaking down of the "con-
sensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly designed to pro-
mote." 188 This is no more than the operation of the grievance
17 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
180 Id. at 104.
181383 U.S. at 701.
182 Id. at 702.
8 3 Id. at 703 n.4.
184 See id. at 701, 710.
18 Id. at 702.
186 Id.
1s7Id. at 701.
188 Id. at 702.
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procedure within an existing relationship. The administration of
discovery (as distinguished from the application of a statute of limita-
tions) in labor disputes arising under collective agreements is vitally
important to both employers and unions. The absence of uniformity
would indeed threaten consensuality. Imprudent granting or with-
holding of discovery procedures simply by the operation of a state
statute could thoroughly disrupt an ongoing bargaining relationship.
One aspect of interaction between the Board and arbitration may
be illustrated here. Abuse of arbitral discovery in a particular case
may be challenged before the Board under sections 8(a) (5) or
8(b) (3), as have other tactical abuses in the past,"s as a failure to
bargain in good faith. If an arbitrator were to issue an improperly
intrusive discovery order at the behest of a bad faith bargainer, the
Board has ample precedent on which to ground its remedial reaction."0
Abuse of discovery, of course, is far more likely to be effectively
remedied by the arbitrator himself. Failing that, the Board is available.
More immediately, however, should the arbitrator's order initiate or
perpetuate an abuse, resort should be available (under section 301)
to the protection of Federal Rule 30(b). There, a pattern of workable
superintendency already exists-there is no need for judicial innovation.
The federal judiciary have acquired considerable experience in adminis-
tering discovery rules (as have many state courts) and have demon-
strated their willingness and capacity to adapt to the Court's arbitration
rationales which insulate arbitral discretion.
There is no reason to anticipate unusual difficulties in the inter-
action among courts, the Board, and arbitrators in administering a
federal arbitral discovery remedy. Yet this inevitable interaction at
least needs the uniformity of a federal remedy so that a welter of
conflicting legal rules will not hamper or frustrate the intelligent
resolution, responsive to collective bargaining realities, of arbitral
discovery problems. Hoosier Cardinal amply supports the conclusion
that uniformity will be required when it is needed to avoid the
frustration of an important goal of labor policy. 9' Disclosure in col-
'
8 9 See, e.g., NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949);
NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887
(1953). But see NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). In
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962), the Court declared that "the Board is
authorized to order the cessation of behavior which is in effect a refusal to negotiate,
or which directly obstructs or inhibits the actual process of discussion, or which reflects
a cast of mind against reaching agreement."
1OSee, e.g., Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963) (Board declined to honor
arbitrator's award because contractual issue did not encompass statutory issue of pro-
tected concerted action).
191 In considering the federal status of an arbitral discovery remedy in cases aris-
ing in or affecting interstate commerce, the doctrines unwound from Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), are not apposite. We are not concerned with what law
should be applied in diversity actions. Instead, we are concerned with the scope of
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lective bargaining, as the Court recognized in Acme Industrial and
earlier cases, is most assuredly that kind of goal.
C. Sources of Law for the Fashioning of Section 301
Arbitral Discovery
The Supreme Court in Lincoln Mills made necessary the develop-
ment of a body of federal law to be applied in actions under section
301 (a). The courts were directed to fashion this law from various
existing legal rules-both state and federal. Obviously, if arbitral dis-
covery is to be administered under the aegis of section 301, both federal
and state discovery rules are ready-made sources for discovery pro-
cedure. Less obvious, perhaps, but nonetheless available and potentially
quite useful as an innovative resource, is the United States Arbitration
Act. 92 We shall consider each in turn.
1. The Protections Afforded by the Discovery Rules
A major reason for acceptance of the Federal Rules is quite evi-
dently the fact that the protections built into them as safeguards to
undue intrusiveness are quite extensive. Thus rule 26(a) establishes
that "Any party may take the testimony of any person, including a
congressional intent embodied in section 301. This is a matter of federal law since
Lincoln Mills. At the same time, however, two observations may be made in passing.
First, Professor J. W. Moore, considering the import of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1 (1941), has concluded that the discovery rules are "procedural" under the Erie
doctrine so that "a federal court need not follow the discovery practice of the state in
which the court is sitting even though the matter facing the Court is local in nature."
1A J. MooRE, Funm~ . PRAcTicEf 0.317[3] (2d ed. 1965). See also Developments in
the Law--Discovery, 74 HAxv. L. REv. 940, 1048 (1961) : "A state's failure to provide
particular discovery devices would not seem to be bound up with that state's definition
of rights and obligations. Moreover, the existence of the Rules Enabling Act evi-
dences a strong federal policy favoring a uniform system of federal procedure. To
deny discovery when the Federal Rules would normally allow it is to attack the very
heart of that system." Second, in assessing the constraints on the utilization by federal
courts of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court in Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460 (1965), has held that the applicability of the procedures detailed in the Fed-
eral Rules shall not be barred by Erie in diversity cases. Categorizing as an "incor-
rect assumption," id. at 469-70, the notion that Erie "constitutes the appropriate test
of the validity and therefore the applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure,"
the Court declared that
The Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule. It is true that
there have been cases where this Court has held applicable a state rule in the
face of an argument that the situation was governed by one of the Federal
Rules. But the holding of each such case was not that Erie commanded dis-
placement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent state rule, but rather that the
scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged, and
therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered the point in dispute,
Erie commanded the enforcement of state law.
Id. at 470. See Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Dis-
cretion in the Choice of National and State Rides for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
797 (1957), observing that a federal court will use state law either because it has to do
so under Erie or because it is preferable to a national substantive rule. Professor
Mishkin added, and Lincoln Mills confirmed, a third choice, that of state law because
it is preferable, not as a "state law," but, by absorption, as "national labor policy."
192 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964).
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party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories
for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for
both purposes." Witnesses may be compelled by subpoena to attend,
as provided in rule 45, and shall be subject to direct and cross-examina-
tion under oath. Rule 26(b) states that it will not be a ground for
an objection to the deposition "that the testimony will be inadmissible
at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence." The deponent may be exam-
ined "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action."
Rule 30(a) provides for detailed notice to other parties to a pend-
ing action of the proposed taking of "the deposition of any person upon
oral examination." Rule 30(b) establishes comprehensive protective
grounds for objections "upon notice and for good cause shown." The
court in which the action is pending may order that no deposition shall
be taken; or that it be taken at a certain place; or that it be taken only
on written interrogatories; or that certain matters be excluded from
inquiry; or that no one shall be present other than the parties and
their counsel; or that the deposition, once taken, may be sealed and
opened only upon order of the court; or that secret processes, develop-
ments, or research need not be disclosed; or that the parties shall
simultaneously file information in sealed envelopes to be opened only
as directed by the court.
The final clause of rule 30(b) is the all-embracing provision that
"the court may make any other order which justice requires to protect
the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression."
Under rule 30(d) the court may also at any time during the taking of
the deposition order the examination "to cease forthwith" or limit the
scope and manner of its taking "upon a showing that the examination
is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to
annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party." Furthermore,
rule 31 (d) provides for the protection of persons whose depositions are
being taken after service of written interrogatories by extending to
them "upon good cause shown" any of the orders set forth in rule
30(b) "which is appropriate and just."
Rule 33 establishes a system of written interrogatories to be served
after commencement of an action upon and answered "separately and
fully" in writing under oath and signed by "any adverse party," who
"shall furnish such information as is available to the party." But
objections may be served and heard on notice "at the earliest practicable
time." Also, the number of interrogatories or sets of them to be served
may be limited "as justice requires to protect the party from annoyance,
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expense, embarrassment, or oppression." The protective provisions of
rule 30(b) are also expressly made applicable to the party from whom
answers to interrogatories are sought under rule 33.
Rule 34 provides for ihe production of all kinds of documents
"which constitute or contain evidence," or for entry upon premises to
inspect or record things there, so long as either is within the scope of
examination permitted by rule 26(b) ("regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action").
Under rule 35, physical examinations may be ordered, but "only
on motion for good cause shown." Rule 36 relates to obtaining ad-
missions of the genuineness of documents.
Rule 37 arrays the contempt power of the district court against
a party or deponent who refuses to be sworn or to answer any question
or produce any document or undergo any physical examination after
being ordered to do so by the court. It also establishes a range of
other retaliatory orders by the court relating to assuming various
incidents as proven or barred to be proven for purposes of the action.193
2. The Federal Arbitration Act
The United States Arbitration Act19 is the only general federal
statute containing an integrated system of procedures for compulsory
arbitration. Section 1 excludes from the Act "contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." Section 2 provides that "[a] written
provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable . . . ." Section 7 empowers arbitrators to "summon in
writing any person to attend before them or any of them as a witness
and in a proper case to bring with him or them any book, record,
document, or paper which may be deemed material as evidence in the
case." Upon a refusal to obey a summons, the federal district court
''upon petition" may compel attendance before the arbitrator through
the sanction of its contempt power. Under section 10, an arbitral
award may be vacated on certain grounds, including "(c) where the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct . . . in refusing to hear evidence
"y 195pertinent and material to the controversy ....
193 See Professor Maurice Rosenberg's analysis of the problems encountered in
regard to rule 37 in Rosenburg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 59 CoLum.
L. REv. 480 (1958).
194 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964).
195 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1964).
Railroad and aviation employees excluded from the Arbitration Act are covered
by the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1964), section 7 of
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When the Act was passed in 1925, resort to labor arbitration was
quite limited, the primary purpose of the Act undoubtedly being the
enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements. The problem
whether the new federal act should encompass grievance arbitration did
not arise. Therefore, the task of interpreting the Arbitration Act does
not require a determination whether there was an intended exclusion.
Rather, the question presented is whether an adaptive or even a selective
inclusion of arbitral discovery limited to labor arbitration is appropriate
to the general purposes Congress sought to achieve in both the arbitra-
tion statute and section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals attempted just such an analysis
in Local 205, JUE v. General Electric Co.,'96 in which it ordered
enforcement of an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining
agreement between GE and the union. The court concluded that it
had jurisdiction under section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act. But
it felt constrained to resort to the Federal Arbitration Act for imple-
menting enforcement machinery, thus rejecting the construction of
section 301 later to be adopted by the majority in Lincoln Mills.
The court's reluctance to consider section 301 as the source of its
enforcement power was principally based on its conclusion that a
"comprehensive and consistent scheme" was "necessary for effective
yet safeguarded arbitration." 197 That scheme only could come from
legislative action. Since section 301 lacked "the procedural specifica-
tions needed for administration of the power to compel arbitration," 198
the court drew these from the Arbitration Act.
The court rejected GE's argument that the act did not apply to
collective agreements, relying on the distinction made in J. I. Case Co.
v. NLRB "I between a "contract of employment" and a collective
agreement. The former is categorized as an "individual hiring con-
tract" which "is subsidiary to the terms of the trade agreement." 200
As to the latter,
which establishes a procedure whereby the parties can select a board of arbitration
with a tie-breaking neutral chairman. 45 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). Any controversy
between a carrier and its employees can voluntarily be submitted to the board. Section
7(h) requires that all testimony before a board of arbitration be taken under oath or
affirmation, and empowers any member of the board to administer oaths or affirmation
and to require attendance of witnesses and the production of documents "as may be
deemed by the board of arbitration material to a just determination of the matters
submitted to its arbitration. . . ." The clerk of the appropriate federal district court
"shall" issue the necessary subpoenas on the request of the board of arbitration or any
one of its members. To compel compliance with a subpoena or "in the event of the
contumacy of any witness appearing before the board of arbitration" the board "may
invoke the aid of the United States courts. . . ." 45 U.S.C. § 157(h).
196 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1955), aff'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
197233 F.2d at 96.
L98 Id. at 97.
199321 U.S. 332 (1944).
200 Id. at 336.
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Collective bargaining between employer and the representa-
tives of a unit, usually a union, results in an accord as to
terms which will govern hiring and work and pay in that unit.
The result is not, however, a contract of employment except
in rare cases; no one has a job by reason of it and no obliga-
tion to any individual ordinarily comes into existence from it
alone. The negotiations between union and management
result in what often has been called a trade agreement, rather
than a contract of employment.201
Hence, the exclusion of individual contracts of hire from section 1 of
the Arbitration Act had no reference to collective agreements.
Unfortunately, Judge Magruder's opinion has been overshadowed
by the Supreme Court's invocation of Lincoln Mills in affirming
General Electric.2  In the former, the Court summoned a "range of
judicial inventiveness" to be "determined by the nature of the prob-
lem," 203 but, oddly, did not also apply the creative analysis suggested
by Judge Magruder. Instead, the Court's brief opinion in General
Electric disposed of Judge Magruder's reasoning in an enigmatic way
which by no means ruled out the possibility of enforcing collective
agreements under the Arbitration Act. The Court simply observed
that, "We follow in part a different path than the Court of Appeals,
though we reach the same result. As indicated in our opinion
in . . . Lincoln Mills . . .we think that § 301 (a) furnishes a body
of federal substantive law for the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements in industries in commerce or affecting commerce . ,, 204
The suggestion would seem to be not that the path of the court of
appeals led in the wrong direction, but that it was unnecessary to use
it to reach the desired goal. Under the Court's reasoning, the arbitra-
tion statute might still be available as a means of implementing the
national labor policy, if Judge Magruder's analysis of the crucial dis-
tinction between a contract of employment and a collective agreement is
valid, as it clearly seems to be.
Additional support for the view that Congress intended the
federal Arbitration Act to be selectively available in labor arbitrations
is derived from section 302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act20 5
In that section Congress placed certain restrictions upon employer
2011d. at 334-35.
202353 U.S. 547, 548 (1957).
203353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
204 353 U.S. at 548.
203 LMRA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1964).
I am indebted to a former student and now experienced labor counsel, Jerry J.
Williams, for calling this § 302 analysis to my attention as corroborating the basic
thesis that the Federal Arbitration Act remains a usable resource for Lincoln Mills
innovation.
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payments to employee representatives. Section 302(c), however, de-
tails certain exceptions to the general bar on such payments, as, for
example, in the case of payments to trust funds for employees so long
as fund administrators are evenly apportioned between employer and
employee representatives. In the event of a deadlock in the adminis-
tration of the funds and failure to designate "an impartial umpire to
decide such dispute," section 302(c) (5) (B) provides that the umpire
"shall, on petition of either group, be appointed by the district court of
the United States . . . ." The umpire, of course, is an arbitrator
and is typically so regarded and designated by parties incorporating
trust fund provisions in collective agreements. The words "on peti-
tion" are words of art which correspond to the provision in section 4
of the Arbitration Act for enforcement by "petition" to an appropriate
federal court. By combining section 302(c) (5) (B) of the LMRA
with section 4 of the Arbitration Act, Congress has thus provided for
the enforcement of arbitration by means of the expeditious petition
procedure rather than through the more cumbersome civil action
processes. °6
These indications of the availability of the arbitration statute are
by no means negated by the Supreme Court's treatment of Judge
Magruder's reasoning in General Electric. Rather, the Court's attitude
toward the Arbitration Act appeared simply to be, "who needs it?" 27
Whatever may have been the reason for the Court's omission of any
mention of the Arbitration Act in its opinion in Lincoln Mills, the
observable consequence of the Court's silence on the import of the Act
is to preserve its availability as a resource for formulating remedies
mandated in that case.
How can the Arbitration Act help fashion a more workable means
of carrying out national labor policy? It need not be regarded as a
source of authority in and of itself. The lever is Lincoln Mills; the
fulcrum is section 301. The Arbitration Act is simply one resource
among several from which techniques may be derived for use in the
labor area. In this regard, section 7 of the Arbitration Act is of
particular importance. There the power is created to summon wit-
206 The petition procedure is far more expeditious than that of rule 3 which pro-
vides that a civil action is commenced by filing a "complaint!' with the court. The
former merely requires notice of motion; the petition is then heard and disposed of by
the district court with little consumption of time.
207 Indeed, it made some judicial and administrative sense in that case to use the
four comers of section 301 (a) as the locus of federal rights. In the fashioning of
remedies, the Arbitration Act could not afford nearly the same degree of flexibility or
responsiveness to changed conditions if it were regarded as the sole and entire source
of enforceability, as it could if it were merely one among several resources for the
shaping of national labor policy. Moreover, it should be realized that the Arbitration
Act does not confer non-diversity jurisdiction irrespective of the amount in contro-
versy as does section 301 (a).
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nesses and produce documents "which may be deemed material as
evidence in the case." Although the Act does not expressly empower
arbitrators to administer oaths, that power is necessarily implied by
the authorization to summon a "witness"--i.e., "one who has been
sworn according to law and deposes as to his knowledge of facts in
issue upon trial of a case. . ,, 208
Although the limitation of the subpoena power in section 7 of the
Arbitration Act to items "material as evidence" would appear to pre-
clude arbitral discovery orders of the scope embodied in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the legal concept of materiality can hardly be
said to be one of precise dimension. Furthermore, section 10 puts
pressure on the arbitrator to resolve doubts of materiality in favor of
admissibility by categorizing a refusal to hear material evidence as
misconduct warranting vacation of an arbitral award. A further
problem arises, however. Since there is no provision in the Act for
the taking of depositions, it would seem to follow that the power to
order depositions of persons unable to attend is implicit in the power
to summon persons to attend as witnesses. Were that reasoning as to
the administering of depositions to prevail it might warrant the con-
clusion that depositions are limited to the same extent as is the sub-
poena duces tecum, that is, to use as evidence material to the proceed-
ing. Here the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure come to our assistance.
Rule 81(a) (3), referring expressly to the Arbitration Act and the
Railway Labor Act, makes the rules applicable "only to the extent that
matters of procedure are not provided for in those statutes." From
the context, it appears that rule 81 (a) (3) refers only to express pro-
cedural provisions in the acts and not to those which might arguably
be deduced from them. If so, restrictions on the use of subpoenas will
not apply to depositions (as to which the Arbitration Act is totally
silent).
There is no more direct a reference to the administration of oaths
in the Federal Rules than there is in the Arbitration Act. Rule 45 (a)
details how subpoenas may be issued to command persons "to give
testimony," but does not use the word "witness." By contrast, rule
45(e), referring more precisely to subpoenas for attendance "at a
hearing or trial," does use the word "witness." Hence, the power to
administer oaths is necessarily implied under both rule 45 and section
7 of the Arbitration Act.
Ho-wever, there remains still another possible obstacle to arbitral
discovery. In commercial arbitration it has been held that prehearing
discovery procedures not provided for in the federal arbitration statute
2o08 State v. Schifsky, 243 Minn. 533, 539, 69 N.W.2d 89, 93 (1955).
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are not available through the Federal Rules. The district court in
Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co.
209
reasoned that rule 81(a) (3) is restricted to "proceedings under" the
arbitration statute, and that prehearing discovery is not a proceeding
"under" the statute as is, for instance, a motion to stay an action pend-
ing arbitration or to confirm an award. It also expressed the view that,
by voluntarily agreeing to arbitration as the mode of settling disputes,
the parties elected to avail themselves of procedures peculiar to the
arbitral process rather than those to be found in judicial proceedings.
The court, therefore, remitted the parties to the commercial arbitration
rules of the American Arbitration Association which they had incor-
porated in their agreement.21 Certainly this is an overly restrictive
reading of rule 81 (a) (3). Moreover, to conclude that the parties can-
not have prehearing discovery because they opted for arbitration instead
of adjudication is to beg the question at issue, which is, shall pre-
hearing discovery be deemed to be as freely available in arbitration
as it is in adjudication? A more convincing analysis was advanced
by a district court sitting in admiralty, which indicated, "[i]t may be
that there is a limited area for application of discovery procedures to
proceedings under Title 9. . . . But I do not think that Rule 81 (a) (3)
is designed to allow judicially imposed and controlled discovery as to
the merits of a controversy which will be referred to arbitration under
9 U.S.C. § 4, except, perhaps, upon a showing of true necessity because
of an exceptional situation. . .1 It is possible, however, to
establish a discovery procedure for labor arbitration which would not
require judicial control of discovery and which would not place judges
and arbitrators in functional conflict. First-instance decisions could
be allocated to the arbitrators and Steelworkers trilogy-type review to
the judges. There would then be no reason to fear judicial intervention
contrary to the intent of the parties who have opted for arbitration in
lieu of adjudication. That, of course, is the remedial structure recom-
mended in this study.
The availability of arbitral discovery is a necessary corollary of
labor arbitration in aid of collective bargaining. It is arguable that
Congress, which intended that a federal common law be evolved to
govern the enforceability of arbitration provisions, logically also in-
tended that this remedial adjunct be available. The courts should not
hold back, therefore, from completing the structure as needs become
manifest with the passage of time and experience. There is a sub-
stantial and inescapable innovative element involved in any choice of
209 20 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
21o Id. at 362.
211 Penn Tanker Co. v. C.H.Z. Rolimpex, 199 F.Supp. 716, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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remedy made by the courts under the aegis of Lincoln Mills. The
important thing is that the choice be soundly based in the realities of
collective bargaining and in the national labor policy designed to
foster it.
IV
CONCLUSION
The major legal hypothesis tested in these pages is that section 301
of the Taft-Hartley Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Lincoln Mills and subsequent cases, has established the availability
of the United States Arbitration Act and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, as needed, to enable the fashioning of remedies for use in
the arbitration of labor disputes affecting interstate commerce. A
subsidiary proposition is that federal law, so construed, enables the
existence of federal arbitral discovery remedies.
In Lincoln Mills the Court summoned federal and state courts
to fashion doctrines that will best effectuate the federal policy to
encourage arbitration of labor disputes. State law may also be
utilized, but it will then "be absorbed as federal law and will not be
an independent source of private rights." 21 Furthermore, the Court
has since declared that the "'procedural questions' which grow out of
the dispute and bear on its final disposition should be left to the
arbitrator." 23 Finally, the Court in Acme Industrial, in deciding
how to allocate jurisdiction among the Board, the courts, and arbi-
trators to administer discovery procedures incident to the operation
of collectively bargained grievance procedures, wisely elected to defer
to the Board so that it might initially formulate policy, thereby making
possible the fashioning of a realistic sequence of interaction between
Board, arbitrator, and courts. But the Supreme Court was also
careful to emphasize that it was not eroding the policies it had enun-
ciated in the Steelworkers trilogy. It explicitly reaffirmed its con-
clusion of "the arbitrator's greater institutional competency" compared
to the courts'. And it clearly implied that the Board should be circum-
spect about intrusions into the realm of contractual interpretation re-
served by the bargainers for arbitration.
The development of viable arbitral discovery procedures is bound
to be complex. It will be more effectively accomplished in the tra-
ditional common law manner than by statutory or general rule-making
fiat. This is especially true in light of the fact that these procedures
will have to evolve in response to both a variety of dynamic collective
bargaining NOW-problems and to the possible modes of interaction
212 353 U.S. at 457.
213 John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964).
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among arbitrators, the Board, and state and federal courts. This com-
plexity is no excuse for recoiling from the task, but it demands great
care in gauging the proper dimensions of arbitral discovery, as well as
prudence in the fashioning of adequate safeguards to curb the over-
zealous and to calm the overanxious in collective bargaining discovery
situations. This kind of prudence is part of the "institutional com-
petency" of arbitrators rather than courts.
The fact that discovery situations are (and should remain) unusual
in labor arbitrations warrants a design for arbitral discovery of some
procedural complexity. It is not a remedy to which either the blithe
spirit or the maliciously bent ought to have ready access. Resistors
must be built into the circuit. At the same time, precautions are also
warranted since arbitral discovery will often be administered by arbi-
trators not accustomed to these legal devices, and will be resorted to by
bargainers more mindful of next year's negotiations than next month's
grievance arbitration. There is a discovery rule which cannot too
often be repeated and which should be the arbitrator's prime procedural
discovery guide. It is well expressed in the words of Chief Justice
Traynor of the California Supreme Court: "[T]o secure discovery,
there must be a showing of more than a wish for the benefit of all the
information in the adversary's files." 214 There must be a showing
both of "need and specificity." 215 The "why," the "what," and the
"how" must be stated as precisely as possible.
We saw in the first article in this study that there is a recurrent
need for a discovery remedy in the routine operation of grievance pro-
cedures, prior to and during the course of arbitrations. We have now
found that legitimate concerns at the prospect of arbitral discovery
could be satisfied so as to enable resort to the remedy when needed,
consonant with sound collective bargaining theory and practice. And
we have now also seen that the relevant federal statutory and judicial
policies support the arbitral discovery remedy.
To conclude on a somewhat ironic note, if these propositions are
valid, an arbitrator who refuses a discovery order in circumstances of
demonstrated need may actually find his award vacated. An almost
universal ground for vacating an arbitrator's award, one of the very
few, is that expressed in the words of section 10(c) of the United
States Arbitration Act: "Where the arbitrators were guilty of mis-
conduct in refusing . . . to hear evidence pertinent and material to
the controversy." 216 Indeed, it has already been stated by the Second
214 Shively v. Stewart, 65 Cal.2d 475, 482, 421 P.2d 65, 69, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217, 221
(1967).
215 Id.
2169 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1964).
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Circuit that under that section a refusal of arbitrators, on request, to
order production of books and records, "material" in the court's view,
may be ground for setting aside a subsequent award.
21 7
In the third and final article of our study we shall turn to a con-
sideration of the Labor Board's disposition of refusal-to-disclose cases
and to the framing of a workable sequence of responsibility for arbitral
discovery, geared to the respective institutional capacities of the Labor
Board, the courts, and the arbitrators.
2
17 Hyman v. Pottberg's Ex'rs, 101 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1939).
Compare Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 263 F. Supp. 488, 495
(C.D. Cal. 1967), where the court vacated an award because the arbitrator refused to
accept the testimony of an employer's witness and remanded to the arbitrator for the
taking of testimony "which the court finds to be pertinent and material," with Atlas
Floor Covering v. Crescent House and Garden, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 2d 211, 333 P.2d
194 (1958), where the court held it was not reversible error for the arbitrator to refuse
to issue a subpoena duces tecuin since the parties had agreed to be bound by AAA
rules expressly providing that arbitrators shall be the judges of materiality and
relevance.
